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1998]
WAITING FOR DIVINE INTERVENTION: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
TRIES TO GIVE MEANING TO INTERVENTION RULES IN
SIERRA CLUB v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

I.

PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND INTERVENTION

Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Educationl is generally remembered for its mandate to end racial
segregation in schools, it also marked an historic turning point in the
American judicial system. 2 Following the Brown decision, the courts began
to see a new species of lawsuits known as public law litigation. 3 While
traditional litigation involves one private party suing a second private party

for the infringement of an easily identifiable right, public law litigation
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Forward:PublicLaw Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 5 (1982) (stating that desegregation
cases of mid-1950s marked beginning of new era of public law litigation); Cindy
Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 279 (1990) (discussing emergence of public law
litigation). One commentator stated:
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education stands as a
benchmark in two great revolutions. The first was social: the forced integration of schoolchildren played a key role in the struggle for racial
equality. The second was judicial: in Brown, the Supreme Court "committed the federal courts to an enterprise of profound social reconstruction."
Id. (quoting Chayes, supra, at 6).
3. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452,
464-65 (5th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging existence of public law cases); Abram
Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1283-84
(1976) (recognizing that public law litigation has overtaken "traditional conception of litigation" in federal district courts); Chayes, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that
rise of new era of public law litigation can be traced to desegregation cases of mid1950s); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies and
JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982) ("Federal courts have been asked
with increasing frequency in recent years to grant injunctive decrees that would
restructure public institutions in accordance with what are asserted to be the commands of the federal Constitution."); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 279 (1989) ("Between the mid1960s and mid-1970s, numerous developments ... significantly changed the nature of considerable federal civil litigation."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 279-80
(acknowledging emergence of public law litigation after Brown); Note, Institutional
Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1474
(1982) [hereinafter InstitutionalReform Litigation] ("Federal courts today systematically reform institutions in both the public and private sectors to redress unlawful
employment discrimination, to improve prison conditions, to desegregate public
schools, to reapportion electoral districts, and to remedy a host of other institutional wrongs.") (footnotes omitted). Other examples of public law litigation include suits in which plaintiffs challenge legislative districting, attack the practices
of mental hospitals and police departments, seek enforcement of environmental
regulations, and question the constitutionality of government spending and statutes. See Vreeland, supra note 2, at 279.
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often involves one or more public entities as a party to a suit concerning
less tangible rights. 4 One scholar described public law litigation as litiga-

tion that centers on "a grievance about the content or conduct of policymost often governmental policy, but frequently the policy of nongovernmental aggregates."5 Another writer noted that public law litigation often
involves widespread impact and seeks to "vindicate significant social values
6
affecting large numbers of people."
4. See Chayes, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that term "'public law litigation'" is

meant to "emphasize that in such cases the federal courts are no longer called

upon to resolve private disputes between private individuals according to the principles of private law"); cf Fletcher, supra note 3, at 638 (stating that structure of
institutional suits tends to be "sprawling, with a large number of parties, intervenors, and amici").
In public law litigation courts are asked to deal with "grievances over the administration of some public or quasi-public program and to vindicate the public
policies embodied in the governing statutes or constitutional provisions." Chayes,
supra note 2, at 4. Traditional private litigation has five distinctive characteristics:
(1) it is bipolar, meaning there are two parties in a "winner-take-all" confrontation;
(2) the suit is retrospective in that it determines the legal consequences of a discrete set of facts which occurred entirely in the past; (3) right and remedy are
joined in a "close, mutually defining" relationship; (4) the lawsuit is bounded in
time and effect, meaning that judicial involvement ends with a resolution of the
dispute and its impact is limited to the two parties before the court; and (5) the
entire suit is initiated and controlled by the two parties. See id. at 4-5.
In contrast to private litigation, public law litigation has an amorphous party
structure that is "defined ad hoc as the proceedings unfold." Id. at 5. Public law
litigation is also prospective in that it questions the effect of a governmental policy
in the present and future. See id. The remedy in public law litigation frequently is
not derived logically from the right asserted because it is designed to be corrective
rather than compensatory. See id. A prospective, corrective remedy implies continuing judicial involvement, and because the remedy is directed at governmental
policy, it will most likely impact persons not before the court. See id.; see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 280-81 (examining salient characteristics of public law litigation). In public law litigation, individuals frequently try to litigate their claims as
class actions, and defendants are usually large, bureaucratic, governmental institutions or agencies. See id. (noting that many defendants are prisons or schools).
The dispute generally revolves around the policy, practice, operation or decisionmaking of those defendants, and plaintiffs often seek nonmonetary, injunctive relief. See id. The remedial stage of public law litigation differs from that in private
litigation because it is likely to involve a "'long continuous relationship between
the judge and the institution,' lasting years after the entry of the initial decree." Id.
at 281 (quoting Owen M..Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 I-L v. L. REv. 1, 27 (1979)). In assessing a remedy, courts may have to
"assemble predictive and legislative facts to formulate, implement, and monitor
complex affirmative decrees governing large bureaucracies." Id.
5. Chayes, supra note 2, at 5 ("In the contemporary model, the subject matter
of the litigation is not a dispute between private parties, but a grievance about the
content or conduct of policy-most often governmental policy, but frequently the
policy of nongovernmental aggregates.").
6. Carl Tobias, Standingto Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 415, 419. This commentator distinguished between two types of public law litigation, "institutional reform" litigation and "public interest" litigation. See id. at 419-20 (stating that

former type of litigation experienced substantial growth between 1965 and 1975
while latter type continues to grow). In the former, plaintiffs seek to "improve the
operation of substantial agencies or governmental institutions, such as prisons and
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In order to influence the outcome of these cases, which have the potential to affect a great number of people, public interest groups have
sought to intervene in pending federal litigation under Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"). 7 Advantages of intervention
by public interest groups include protecting the interests of large segments of the public, providing courts with a broader base of information,
allowing judges to make more well-informed decisions, promoting judicial
economy and increasing the legitimacy of court decisions in the public's
eye. 8 Following the lead of public interests groups, many state and local
schools." Id. at 419. In the latter, plaintiffs seek to vindicate "the political, moral
or ideological interests of many individuals in trying to guarantee proper governmental decisionmaking." Id. at 420. In typical public interest litigation, plaintiffs
are challenging the administrative determinations of federal agencies. See id.
Many of these suits exhibit a three-party structure, including "the government,
public interest litigants, and regulated interests or their representatives, such as
trade associations." Id.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 24; see, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 57 (1986)
(involving intervention by anti-abortion advocate in suit challenging constitutionality of law regulating abortion); Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman,
82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying intervention by environmental organization in suit between timber industry association and U.S. Department of Agriculture); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996) (allowing group
representing farmers and State of Texas to intervene in suit between environmentalist group and U.S. Department of Agriculture); Jenkins v. Missouri, 78 F.3d
1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of intervention by parent's group in
school desegregation suit); Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 989 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (involving intervention by groups representing public officials of
different racial and ethnic groups in employment discrimination action); United
States v. Georgia, 19 F.3d 1388, 1395 (11th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal of order
denying intervention by citizens group in school desegregation case); United
States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing citizens group
to intervene in suit brought by United States against parties allegedly responsible
for release of hazardous wastes), vacated sub nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1272 (7th Cir.
1985) (affirming denial of intervention by anti-abortion organization in suit
brought by group of physicians challenging constitutionality of Illinois statute regulating abortion); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir.
1985) (denying intervention to nonprofit, environmentalist corporation in condemnation action brought by United States); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt,
713 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing nonprofit wildlife organization to intervene in suit between land development corporation and Secretary of Interior);
see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 323 (discussing use of intervention by public interest groups); Ellyn J. Bullock, Note, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why
Standing's CriteriaShould Not Be Incorporatedinto Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REv. 605, 605-06 (proposing that environmental organizations use intervention of
right as alternative means of access to federal courts). One commentator also
stated that "[m]ost public interest litigation today involves requests to intervene
under Rule 24 filed by regulated entities, public interest litigants, or the government." Tobias, supra note 3, at 319.
8. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participationin Private Litigation, 21
ARIz. ST. L.J. 853, 941 n.353 (1989) (listing purposes that public interest intervention serves). One author stated:
[L] itigation increasingly involves claims arising out of public actions such
as in school integration, employment discrimination, prison reform, and
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governments are now attempting to intervene in suits brought by public
law litigants that may affect either their citizens or their regulatory power. 9
In public law cases, a number of federal judges have applied the Rules
in ways that impede the public interest litigants' efforts. 10 Although the
Rules may have been originally drafted with private litigation in mind, they
are compatible with public law litigation."1 In fact, some amendments to
environmental protection cases, which can have a significant impact on
those outside the litigation. Several authors have argued that broadbased intervention of right should be recognized to protect those outside
interests. Such intervention serves several additional functions as well. It
provides courts with a broader base of information and a wider perspective on the issues before them; promotes judicial economy by resolving
multiple claims at one time; and increases public acceptance of the
court's decision as having taken into account the concerns of a broader
base of actors.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 115 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
1997) (reversing denial of intervention by State of Texas in suit brought by environmental group against municipal governments); Glickman, 82 F.3d at 110 (reversing denial of intervention by State of Texas and Farm Bureau in suit brought
by environmental group against U.S. Department of Agriculture); Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing denial of intervention by State of Arizona and Apache County in suit
brought by environmental organizations against federal administrative agency); Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1486 (9th Cir.
1993) (reversing denial of intervention by City of Phoenix in suit brought by environmental group against federal administrative agency); United States v. Texas E.
Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of intervention by State of Pennsylvania in suit for civil penalties brought by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against operator of interstate gas pipeline);
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving
intervention of eight Oregon counties and private contractors in suit by environmental group challenging U.S. Department of Interior's sale of timber).
10. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 270-72 (providing overview of application of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in public law litigation); Bullock, supra note 7, at
632-33 (stating that some courts have used interpretations of Rule 24 to block intervention by third persons). One commentator noted that judicial treatment of
the Rules has had "adverse implications for public interest litigants." Tobias, supra
note 3, at 328. This commentator also stated that "a number of judges has [sic]
enforced numerous Rules in ways that adversely affect [public law litigants] and
which now constitute a discernible pattern." Id. at 270. He further stated:
Despite the pervasive presence of public interest litigants, the federal judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particularly when applying
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts have applied
numerous Rules in ways that disadvantage public interest litigants, especially in contrast to traditional litigants, such as private individuals, corporations, and the government.
Id.
11. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 270 (stating that disadvantageous interpretations of Rules were not inevitable). One commentator stated that "[m]ost of the
Rules, as adopted originally in 1937 and as amended subsequently, did not anticipate, but were compatible with, public law litigation and public interest litigants'
involvement in federal civil litigation." Id. He also noted that "certain ideas underlying the Rules as a set of litigating principles" may have contributed to the
expanding participation rights of public interest litigants in civil suits. Id. He fur-
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12
the Rules seem to consider the interests of public interest litigants.

Some judges have manipulated Rule 24, which grants third parties the
right to intervene in a pending lawsuit, to keep public interest litigants out
of the courtroom.'" Under Rule 24, applicants for intervention must
demonstrate "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action" before they can join the lawsuit. 14 Court decither asserted that judicial application of Rule 24(a) "reflects the private law phrasing of the provision and concomitant judicial thinking," and that some judges have
applied the Rule to public law litigation as if it were a private lawsuit, employing a
narrow, technical and rigid interpretation. Id. at 328.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) (stating that interests that are furthered by Rule 19 "are not only those of the parties, but also that of
the public"); FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) (noting that previous version of Rule 23 had been too restrictive in class actions); FED. R, Crv. P. 24
advisory committee's note (1966) (stating that amendment is intended to broaden
application of Rule 24); see also Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (observing that amendment of Rule 23 was meant to
increase use of class action device to condense lawsuits, promote judicial economy
and vindicate interests of large numbers of people who individually would be unable to litigate); Tobias, supra note 3, at 286 (stating that Rules reflect transformation in conceptualization of certain litigation and many of its components,
including interest needed to initiate and impose liability in lawsuit, subject matter
of lawsuit, party structure, relief afforded and role ofjudges in resolving disputes);
Tobias, supra note 6, at 430 ("Some courts and writers have contended that the
drafters revised all three partyjoinder amendments or at least Rule 24 with public
law cases in mind."). But see United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749
F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that Rule 24 was drafted for private litigation); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that Rule 24 was
tailored for private actions and must be read differently in other contexts); Arthur
R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem", 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 669-70 (1979) (stating that importance of
Rule 23's revision to public law litigation has been overstated and that drafters
finished amendment of some Rules before public law explosion); Note, Intervention
in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1174, 1177 (1976) ("[Rule 24]
was designed with the more traditional private action in mind.").
13. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 323 (discussing judicial application of Rule 24
in public law litigation). Some courts have created presumptions or judicial expansions of the Rule's requirements, "which do not appear in the rule's text or in
the Advisory Committee Note." Id. This treatment of Rule 24 reflects an approach
by the courts that disadvantages public law litigants, both as plaintiffs and as applicants for intervention. See id. Public law litigants seeking to intervene in a suit
between a private party and the government have been less successful than private
individuals seeking to intervene in suits between a public interest group and the
government. See id. at 323 n.314.
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (2). For the text of Rule 24, see infra note 35 and
accompanying text. Many courts and commentators have discussed the interest
requirement under Rule 24. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 154 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[A]n applicant is still
required to have an 'interest' in the litigation .... "); Forest Conservation Council, 66
F.3d at 1493 ("To intervene as of right under [Rule 24] the applicant must claim
an interest the protection of which may, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds without him."); United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
995 F.2d at 1481 (stating that applicant must claim interest relating to property or
transaction that is subject of action); Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d at 413
("In order to show entitlement to intervention of right under Rule 24(a) (2), Penn-
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sions have varied greatly on what interests are sufficient to satisfy this requirement.1 5 Some courts have interpreted Rule 24 broadly, allowing
public interest litigants to intervene more easily, while other courts have
interpreted Rule 24 very narrowly, requiring applicants to show a concrete
interest in the pending action. 16
sylvania must demonstrate an interest in the subject matter of this action ...
PortlandAudubon Soc'y, 866 F.2d at 308 (stating that applicant must assert "'an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action"'
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2))); 6JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 24.03[1] [a] (3d ed. 1997) (stating that applicant must have "an interest
in the subject matter of the litigation"); Tobias, supra note 3, at 323 (noting that
"[n]early all courts read Rule 24(a) (2) to require that applicants.., show that they
have the requisite interest in the pending litigation"); Vreeland, supra note 2, at
282 (noting that Rule 24 allows intervention of right when applicant claims interest relating to property or transaction that is subject of action).
15. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (acknowledging circuit
split on interpretation of Rule 24); Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc.
v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that case law regarding interest requirement of Rule 24 "varies substantially between courts"); Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d at 412 (noting that general rules and past precedents do not
provide dependable guidance); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,
884 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts have not yet adopted uniform
standard for determining who is real party in interest); United States v. 36.96 Acres
of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (noting that
majority's decision conflicts with past precedent and authority); Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that "general rules and past decisions
cannot provide uniformly dependable guides"); MOORE ET AL., supra note 14,
§ 24.03[2] [d] (describing lack of consensus regarding interest requirement between circuits); Greenbaum, supra note 8,at 914 ("Unfortunately, courts disagree
significantly about the meaning of the interest requirement."); Tobias, supra note
3, at 323-25 (discussing different circuit court interpretations of interest requirement of Rule 24); Tobias, supra note 6, at 432 ("Numerous courts and commentators have recognized that the federal judiciary has experienced considerable
difficulty in defining the interest necessary to satisfy Rule 24(a) (2) since the time
of its 1966 amendment."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 283 ("Intervention by public
interest groups implicates two general splits in opinion among the federal courts
of appeals.").
16. Compare United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for intervention."), vacated sub
nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987), Hooker
Chem. &Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d at 983 ("As amended, Rule 24(a) (2) is a nontechnical directive to courts that provides the flexibility necessary 'to cover the multitude
of possible intervention situations."' (quoting Restor-A-Dent Dental Labs., Inc. v.
Certified Alloy Prods., Inc., 725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1984))), Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) ("This court stated that 'Rule
24 traditionally has received a liberal construction in favor of applications for intervention."' (quoting Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982))), and Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (" '[0] bviously tailored to fit
ordinary civil litigation, these provisions require other than literal application in
atypical cases."' (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765,
767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc))), with Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that applicant must show "direct, significant and legally protectable interest"), 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 859 (requiring interest greater than
that to fulfill standing requirement before intervention will be granted), and
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In Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio,17 the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit invoked a common interpretation of Rule 24
and held that the State of Texas satisfied the interest requirement, and
thus could intervene in a pending action between an environmental organization and several municipal governments. 18 Part II of this Note discusses the history of intervention in federal courts and the development of
Rule 24, which grants the right to intervene in federal litigation. 19 Next,
Part III presents the facts and procedural history of Sierra Club.20 Thereafter, Part IV analyzes the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and decision. 2 1 Part IV
also explains how the court's interpretation of Rule 24 complies with
Supreme Court precedent and the intentions of the Rule's drafters, and
how the results of its application were appropriate for that case. 22 Finally,
Part V of this Note discusses the possible reverberations of the Fifth Cir23
cuit's holding upon future public law litigation.
II.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERVENTION OF RIGHT

A.

HistoricalDevelopment of Intervention

Generally, persons who are not parties to a suit are not able to take
part in or control the proceedings of the suit, but through the process of
intervention, a person may obtain the status of a party to an existing suit
and thus be able to fully participate. 24 Intervention is a unique proceSouthern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (requiring interest equal to standing before intervention will be granted).
17. 115 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1997).
18. See id. at 313 (discussing action under federal legislation protecting endangered species brought by Sierra Club against San Antonio and other
municipalities).
19. For a discussion of Rule 24 and intervention in federal courts, see infra
notes 24-102 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the facts of Sierra Club, see infra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the court's reasoning and decision in Sierra Club, see
infra notes 119-49 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the validity of the court's decision in Sierra Club, see
infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.

23. For a discussion of the possible impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Richman v. First Woman's Bank, 104 F.3d 654, 659-60 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that persons who are not parties to underlying action below have
no automatic right to participate in adversary proceeding or appeal of court order); Warshaw-Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 85 So. 2d 623, 625 (Fla. 1956) (stating that
persons who are not parties of record have no standing to participate in proceedings); Strickland v. Hughes, 160 S.E.2d 313, 316 (N.C. 1968) ("Only parties of
record to a suit have a standing therein which will enable them to take part in or
control the proceedings."); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 124 (1987) (stating that
"[p]ersons who are not parties of record to a suit have no standing... that will
enable them to take part in or control the proceedings" and that "[i]f they have
occasion to ask [for] relief in relation to the matters involved, they must obtain the
status of parties or institute an independent suit"); Bullock, supra note 7, at 605
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25
dural device that attempts to balance a number of competing interests.
On one side of the balance is the existing parties' interest in controlling
the course of the litigation that they initiated. 26 Other persons, however,
have an interest in entering the litigation if the outcome will have an effect
on them. 2 7 In addition, the person seeking to intervene may have some
expertise or additional information that could help lead the court to the
best decision. 28 Finally, the courts have an interest in resolving controver-

("Intervention is a statutorily governed procedural mechanism for entering ongoing lawsuits.").
25. See United States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 412 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule 24 represents balance between conflicting goals);
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The decision whether intervention of right is warranted thus involves an accommodation between two
potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale by resolving
related issues in a single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming
fruitlessly complex or unending."); Raoul Berger, Intervention by Public Agencies in
Private Litigation in the Federal Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65, 65 (1940) ("The basic problem of intervention practice is the adjustment between the need [for protection of
third parties] and the traditional view that a law suit is a private controversy in
which outsiders have no place."); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent:
The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties,1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 143 (discussing
tension between possibility of applicant initiating separate suit and letting intervenor disrupt pending lawsuit that is near resolution); Bullock, supra note 7, at 627
(acknowledging potential conflict of interests between applicant and original parties); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 294 ("Rule 24(a) aims at a balance between the
interests of the outsiders, the original parties, and the courts.").

26. See 7C

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1901 (2d ed. 1986) ("Ordinarily those who are presently litigants will prefer that
others not be brought in .... "). The authors also stated that "'the notion that
third persons might invite themselves into lawsuits between others ran counter to
the Anglo-American notion that the plaintiff was master of the suit."' Id. (quoting
JAMES

& HAZARD,

CML PROCEDURE

549 (3d ed. 1985)); see alsoJack B. Weinstein,

Litigation Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions-Some Views on Participation, 13 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 231, 232 (1980) ("If the plaintiff is an individual with
limited funds, interested only in his own rights, there may well be reason to try to
limit the case so that the courts do not become too expensive for those who need
them but are not poverty stricken or wealthy."); Bullock, supra note 7, at 623 (stating that intervention is contrary to tradition that plaintiff controls suit); Vreeland,
supra note 2, at 298-99 (stating that courts usually defer to right of original parties
to control lawsuit and that intervention threatens control because intervenors will
probably introduce "new evidence, new issues, and new positions on existing
issues").
27. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 329 (noting that without intervention "particular individuals or entities may be wholly unrepresented, while certain viewpoints
may remain unarticulated"); Weinstein, supra note 26, at 232 ("[T]hose persons
who may be affected by a court's decision should have the right to be heard before
their fate is sealed."); Bullock, supra note 7, at 627 ("[P]eople on the outside want
to become parties if they believe that a decision may affect them."); Vreeland,
supra note 2, at 295-98 (discussing interests that potential intervenors have in litigation). One commentator listed interests of the applicant as introducing information on the potential effects of the court's decision, advising and controlling the
formulation of a consent decree, and voicing concerns of people affected by the
litigation but not parties to it. See id. at 295-98.
28. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[5] [a] ("[C]ourts look favorably
on intervention petitions offering a unique perspective."); Tobias, supra note 3, at
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sies efficiently and deciding related disputes in a single action. 29 Recognizing these interests, some federal courts have used the Rules as a
30
practical tool to strike the appropriate balance.
329 ("The denial of these intervention applications may deprive the federal judiciary of information, arguments, or perspectives it needs to make the best decisions."); Weinstein, supra note 26, at 232 (stating that effective functioning of
courts requires allowing some to intervene "since it minimizes the chance of error
due to the lack either of knowledge or appreciation of the variety of interests that
may be affected"); Bullock, supra note 7, at 627 ("The court seeks efficiency in
having all relevant information and all related issues presented simultaneously.");
Vreeland, supra note 2, at 296 ("Public interest groups have both the expertise and
the motivation to ensure that shared societal values are considered.").
29. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129,
147-48 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing interest of courts in judicial
economy); Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d at 412 (stating that court has goals
of "achiev[ing] judicial economies of scale by resolving related issues in a single
lawsuit, and [preventing] the single lawsuit from becoming fruitlessly complex or
unending"); Smuck, 408 F.2d at 179 (acknowledging that courts have goal of "'disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process"' (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700
(D.C. Cir. 1967))); Laycock, supra note 25, at 143 (discussing effect of intervention
on judicial economy); Weinstein, supra note 26, at 246 (stating that costs to courts
"in terms of complexity" due to intervention are outweighed by "the advantage of
access to the courts by those who may be affected by the judicial decisions"); Bullock, supra note 7, at 627 (stating that intervention can promote judicial economy
"via expansion of the information available to the court, and consolidation of related issues"); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 299 ("Intervention affects the courts' interests in fair and efficient adjudication, both in the case at hand and in the court
system as a whole."). One commentator noted that "[w]hen an outsider claims a
litigable interest, intervention may promote economy at a systematic level by avoiding duplicative suits, which waste resources, clog dockets, and frequently introduce
the possibility of inconsistent judgments and complex collateral estoppel issues."
Id.
30. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d
1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that interest test of Rule 24 is primarily practical guide to involve as many parties as is compatible with due process); Sierra Club
v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Rule 24 is given broad construction in favor of granting intervention);
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that
interest requirement of Rule 24 is primarily practical guide and "is basically a
threshold [criterion], rather than the determinative criterion for intervention");
United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that when
court is applying Rule 24 it is "guided primarily by practical considerations"), vacated sub nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987);
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) ("'Rule 24
traditionally has received a liberal construction in favor of applications for intervention."' (quoting Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982))); Smuck, 408 F.2d at 179 ("[T]he 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process."); Nuesse, 385 F.2d
at 700 (noting that "these provisions [of Rule 24] require other than literal application in atypical cases"); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 825
(5th Cir. 1967) (stating that Advisory Committee "deliberately set out on a more
pragmatic course" when it revised Rule 24 and that narrow interpretation of Rule
would undermine "painstaking work of the Advisory Committee"); MOORE ET AL.,
supranote 14, § 24.03[1] [b] ("The inquiry required under Rule 24(a) (2) is a flexi-
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Intervention is a relatively recent development in the law. 3 1 The procedural device was not available at common law, and its origins in the
United States lie in the civil law of Louisiana. 3 2 Other states eventually
began to allow intervention in suits in equity, especially where the decision
in the case may have harmed the party seeking to intervene. 33 Statutes
granting a right to intervene began to appear when code pleading was
adopted, but the right was very narrowly defined.3 4 Today, the right to
intervene is usually granted by a court's rules of civil procedure, and in
ble one, and a practical analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case is
appropriate.").
31. SeeWRG-rr ET AL., supra note 26, § 1901 (discussing historical evolution of
intervention). The authors stated:
Intervention ... is a comparatively recent innovation in Anglo-American
legal procedure. It was a familiar device in the Roman law and thus in
the civil law generally and there had been rudimentary procedures of this
kind available in admiralty, and occasionally at common law and equity,
but these were not well developed nor of very general applicability.
Id.; see alsoJames W. Moore & Edward H. Levi, FederalIntervention: I. The Right to
Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE LJ. 565, 568-74 (1936) (discussing origins of
intervention practice).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Widen, 38 F.2d 517, 518-19 (N.D. Ill. 1930) ("At
common law intervention was not recognized. Jurisdiction of intervening petitions
came to be recognized only in courts of chancery.") (citations omitted); Ex parte
Gray, 47 So. 286, 288 (Ala. 1908) ("The practice of interventions, which has grown
up in our equity courts, seems to have been borrowed from the civil law .... ");
Fischer v. Hanna, 47 P. 303, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1896) ("[The statute granting
intervention] comes from the civil law and Code Napoleon, and was taken from
Louisiana. It is a proceeding unknown to courts of common law and equity in
Great Britain and the United States."); Gale v. Shillock, 30 N.W. 138, 143 (Dakota
1886) ("The law of intervention is first found in the Code of Procedure of Louisiana."); Warshaw-Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 85 So. 2d 623, 625-26 (Fla. 1956) ("[Tlhe
right of one to intervene in an action, suit, or proceeding between others is generally regarded as a purely statutory right, or a right of statutory origin, and as one
which is to be exercised according to the statute authorizing it. It was unknown to
common-law procedure."); Hyman v. Cameron, 46 Miss. 725, 726-27 (1872) ("It is
a novel proceeding in chancery to allow a stranger to a suit to become a party for
the purpose of amending a bill . . . and then conduct the suit in his own name.
Intervention is a civil law term, a pleading familiar in that system."); see also WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 26, § 1901 (stating that intervention was contrary to Anglo-American legal principles). See generally 59 Am. JUR. 2n Parties § 126 (1987) (stating that
"[iIntervention was unknown to common-law procedure"). Intervention was employed to a small extent in the English ecclesiastical courts. See id. § 126 n.93.
33. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 576 (1912) (reversing denial
of intervention by person who had interest in funds held by court and subject to its
disposition); Widen, 38 F.2d at 518 (discussing motion to intervene by person who
had deposited money with court as bail for defendant which United States wanted
to levy); Duke v. Franklin, 162 P.2d 141, 144 (Or. 1945) (allowing third person to
intervene when statute did not grant intervention because applicant sought.same
relief as plaintiff).
34. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1901 ("Statutory provisions for intervention became more common with the adoption of code pleading but even these
were frequently narrow in scope and limited to actions for the recovery of specific
real or personal property.").
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suits pending in federal courts, the right is granted by Rule 24 of the Fed35
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since its inception, Rule 24 has contained two types of intervention:
intervention of right and permissive intervention. 36 The former is granted
by section (a) of the Rule if either a statute grants an unconditional right
to intervene or an applicant has an interest in the litigation that is not
adequately represented by the parties and that could be impaired by disposition of the action. 37 Under section (b) of the Rule, permissive inter35. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 24 (granting right to intervene). Rule 24 states:
(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
(b) Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an
action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive
order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency
or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or
made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency
upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon
the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds
therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim
or defense for which intervention is sought. The same procedure shall be
followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to intervene.
When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any action in which the United States or an
officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court shall notify
the Attorney General of the United States as provided in Title 28, U.S.C.
§ 2403. When the constitutionality of any statute of a State affecting the
public interest is drawn in question in any action in which that State or
any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, the court shall
notify the attorney general of the State as provided in Title 28, U.S.C.
§ 2403. A party challenging the constitutionality of legislation should call
the attention of the court to its consequential duty, but failure to do so is
not a waiver of any constitutional right otherwise timely asserted.
Id.
36. See id. (creating two different rights to intervene); MOORE ET AL., supra
note 14, § 24 (recognizing two existing types of intervention, intervention of right
and permissive intervention); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1902 ("Rule 24 always has undertaken to distinguish between two kinds of intervention."); Institutional Reform Litigation,supra note 3, at 1480 ("Rule 24 authorizes certain persons,
whose interests may diverge from those of the parties, to intervene in a lawsuit
either as of right or permissively.") (footnote omitted).
37. See FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a) (stating that applicant "shall be permitted to intervene" if he or she meets requirements of section (a)); MOORE ET AL., supra note
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vention is granted at the court's discretion and can be allowed when there
is a common question of law or fact between the litigation and the applicant's claim or defense. 3 8 When deciding whether to seek intervention
under section (a) or section (b), an applicant must consider three important differences. First, a court may still deny an application for permissive
intervention even if the applicant satisfies the Rule's requirements, but
intervention of right must be granted if the Rule's requirements are satisfied. 39 Second, because granting or denying permissive intervention is
within the discretion of the trial court, appellate courts are more likely to
reverse a denial of intervention of right. 40 Third and finally, some courts
have required applicants for intervention of right to demonstrate standing
under Article III of the United States Constitution, while permissive intervenors may not have to make such a showing. 4 1 Because only section (a)
of Rule 24 was at issue in Sierra Club, this Note will focus solely on intervention of right.
14, § 24.03 (discussing right to intervene granted by Rule 24(a)); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 26, § 1902 (discussing intervention of right).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (2) (stating that applicant "may be permitted to
intervene in an action" when there is common question of law or fact); MOORE ET
AL.,

supra note 14, § 24.10 (discussing permissive intervention);

WRIGHT ET AL.,

supra note 26, § 1902 (describing when permissive intervention may be granted).
39. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1902 ("An application for permissive
intervention is addressed to the discretion of the court, whereas an application for
intervention of right seems to pose only a question of law.") (footnote omitted).
40. See id. ("The appealability of an order denying intervention-and quite
possibly also the scope of review on that appeal-has been thought to turn on the
subdivision of the rule that was appropriate.").
41. See City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[A] movant for leave to intervene under Rule 24(a) (2) must
have Article III standing to participate in proceedings before the district court.");
Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing relation of standing to intervention under Rule 24); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d
1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that interest must be so direct that applicant
has right to maintain claim for relief sought); Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462,
1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[A]n intervenor of right, just like an ordinary plaintiff,
must have standing."); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747
F.2d 777, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that applicant could not intervene because
he "lack[ed] a protectable interest sufficient to confer standing"); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[I]ntervention has been held subject to the prudential standing requirement
that 'the presence of harm to a party does not permit him to assert the rights of
third parties in order to obtain redress for himself."' (quoting DuPree v. United
States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 1977))); Tobias, supra note 6, at 437 ("Numerous courts have demanded that applicants possess an interest equivalent to standing."); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1902 ("Whether intervention is of
right or permissive only frequently has been regarded as decisive in deciding
whether independent grounds of federal jurisdiction must exist with regard to the
person who seeks to intervene ....
").Some commentators noted that "[t]he need
for independent jurisdictional grounds depends on the extent to which the 'ancillaryjurisdiction' of a federal court may go." Id. This question cannot be answered
by only referring to Rule 24, for it requires analysis of each case's merits. See id.
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When Rule 24 was originally enacted in 1937, the drafters intended it
to codify a practice already existing in the federal courts. 42 The language
of that version is similar to the current version, but it granted intervention
of right in slightly different circumstances. 43 Unless a federal statute
granted an unconditional right to intervene, applicants could only intervene of right under the 1937 Rule if they showed that they may be bound
by ajudgment and their interests may be inadequately represented or that
they would be adversely affected by a disposition of property in the custody
of the court. 44 Problems with the language of the 1937 version were apparent from the start, and they culminated in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1937) ("This rule amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in equity."); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 26, § 1903 (noting that 1937 version of Rule 24 has been called "a 'codification of general doctrines of intervention"' (quoting Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941))). But seeCascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1967) (stating that Rule 24 expanded existing intervention doctrines). The Court in Cascadestated that Rule 24
"was not merely a restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity ....
[T]he Advisory Committee stated that Rule 24 'amplifies and restates the present
federal practice at law and in equity.' We therefore know that some elasticity was
injected; and the question is, how much." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 24, advisory
committee's note (1937)).
43. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 428-29 (discussing instances in which 1937
version of Rule 24 granted intervention of right). See generally WRiGHT ET AL., supra
note 26, § 1903 (discussing history of Rule 24). The original Rule 24 distinguished
between intervention by a person whose interest in the action was not adequately
represented and a person who might be adversely affected by a disposition of property in the court's custody. See id. The distinction reflected the two types of intervention statues that the states had adopted. See id. Some of these statutes were
based on the applicant's interests in the lawsuit, while others were limited to suits
over specific types of property. See id. The 1966 amendment to Rule 24 "redefined
the circumstances in which intervention may be had of right." Id. The amendment eliminated the distinction made by the 1937 version and replaced it with the
four-prong test which is used today. See id.
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (1937) (amended 1966). The 1937 version of Rule
24(a) stated:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by ajudgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
Id.
The distinction between sections (a) (2) and (a) (3) stems from the two types
of intervention statutes enacted by the state legislatures. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24
advisory committee's note (1937) ("Under the code two types of intervention are
provided, one for the recovery of specific real or personal property, and the other
allowing intervention generally when the applicant has an interest in the matter in
litigation."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1903 ("This differentiation apparently
came from the two kinds of intervention statutes that had been adopted in the
states. Some were based on an interest in the matter in litigation while others were
limited to cases of specific property.").
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United States45 when the United States Supreme Court stated that applicants must be legally bound by a judgment before they could intervene
under Rule 24(a) (2).46 This interpretation seemed to make intervention
of right under Rule 24(a) (2) impossible in all cases. If representation of
an applicant's interests was inadequate, he or she could not be bound by
the judgment in the action and thus could not intervene, but if his or her
interests were adequately represented, the first half of Rule 24(a) (2) re47
mained unsatisfied.
45. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
46. See id. at 694 (holding that showing by applicant that it will be legally

bound by court's decision "is what must be made out before a party may intervene
as of right"). In Sam Fox Publishing, the United States brought an antitrust suit
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994), against the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), an unincorporated music licensing
association to which the applicants belonged. See id. at 685. The government alleged two distinct types of antitrust violation:
(1) [A]lleged restraint of trade arising out of ASCAP's mode of dealing
with outsiders desiring licenses of compositions in the Society's catalogue; and (2) alleged restraint of competition among the Society's members inter sese, resulting from the asserted domination of the Society's
affairs by a few of its large publisher members who, it was claimed, were
able to control the complexion of the Board of Directors and the apportionment of the Society's revenues.
Id. at 685-86. As relief for the second type of violation, the United States asked the
court to ensure that Board elections be by no method other than a membership
vote in which all members shall have the right to vote and that the distribution of
revenue to members be on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis. See id. at 686. The
applicants' interests in the suit related solely to the second aspect of the government's charges, those involving the Society's internal affairs. See id. A consent
decree was entered within a year of the suit's initiation, but the government
pressed for modifications of the decree in 1959. See id. at 686-87. Before the district court had approved the modifications, the applicants moved to intervene. See
id. at 687. The district court denied intervention and subsequently approved the
modifications of the consent decree. See id. Finding that the applicant was not
entitled to intervention of right and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. See id. at 695. The Court stated that the
effect of the lower court's decree was "not at all the equivalent of being legally
bound, which is what must be made out before a party may intervene as of right."
Id. at 694; see also FED. R. Cv. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) ("If the
'bound' language was read literally in the sense of res judicata, it could defeat
intervention in some meritorious cases.").
47. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1903 ("If the representation of an absent party was inadequate, he could not be bound by the judgment in the action,
and could not intervene, but if he were adequately represented he could not meet
the second half of the test of the former clause (2) and could not intervene.");
Laycock, supra note 25, at 112 ("The Supreme Court held in effect that [Rule 24's]
standard could never be met, because if the would-be intervenor were inadequately represented, he would not be bound."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory
committee's note (1966) (discussing problems with 1937 version in class action
suits). The advisory committee wrote:
A member of a class to whom ajudgment in a class action extended by its
terms.., might be entitled to show in a later action, when the judgment
in the class action was claimed to operate as resjudicata against him, that
the "representative" in the class action had not in fact adequately represented him. If he could make this showing, the class-action judgment
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In an attempt to remove this dilemma, Rule 24 was amended in 1966,
resulting in the version that is currently used. 48 The amendment replaced
the troublesome "bound by" language with a four-prong test to determine
whether a court should grant intervention of right. Under the new Rule
24(a), applicants can intervene if: (1) they submit a timely application; (2)
they have an interest in the subject of the litigation; (3) they are so situated that disposition of the action may impair their ability to protect that
interest; and (4) their interest may be inadequately represented by existing parties.4 9 Courts and scholars have stated that the Rule's drafters
intended the 1966 amendment to broaden the Rule and that courts decidmight be held not to bind him. If a class member sought to intervene in
the class action proper, while it was still pending, on grounds of inadequacy of representation, he could be met with the argument: if the representation was in fact inadequate, he would not be "bound" by the
judgment when it was subsequently asserted against him as res judicata,
hence he was not entitled to intervene; if the representation was in fact
adequate, there was no occasion or ground for intervention.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) ("In attempting to
overcome certain difficulties which have arisen in the application of present Rule
24(a) (2) and (3), this amendment draws upon the revision of the related Rules 19
... and 23... and the reasoning underlying that revision."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 26, § 1903 (describing 1966 amendment and drafters' efforts to correct
problems with previous version); Tobias, supra note 6, at 429 (stating that Sam Fox
PublishingCourt's interpretation of Rule's language "was the major reason for the
amendment of Rule 24 in 1966").
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2). The 1966 amendment states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Id. The 1966 amendment did not affect an applicant's right to intervene when a
statute of the United States grants an unconditional right to intervene. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a) (1); see also Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth four requirements for intervention of right);
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating
that to intervene of right applicant must meet four requirements); Security Ins.
Co. v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that applicant
for intervention must satisfy four requirements); United States v. Georgia, 19 F.3d
1388, 1391 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that district court applied four-part test to
deny motion to intervene); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating that court construes Rule 24 as four-part test); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d
1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth four
requirements which a proposed intervenor must satisfy before intervention of right
is allowed . .

. .");

United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858 (7th Cir.

1985) ("Four requirements must be met before intervention will be granted as of
right."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1903 ("Accordingly in the 1966 revision
there is no longer any reference to being bound by a judgment."); Tobias, supra
note 6, at 429 (stating that 1966 amendment of Rule 24 collapsed previous version's requirements into four-part test); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 282 (discussing
what applicant must show to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)).
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ing motions to intervene should focus on practical issues and balancing
50
competing interests.
Despite the improvements made by the 1966 amendment, however,
courts still disagree over the application of Rule 24(a) (2), especially the
second prong. 5 1 Court decisions have differed significantly on what con50. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S.
129, 153-54 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the revision was to
remedy certain logical shortcomings in the construction of the former 24(a)(2)
... and to give recognition to decisions . .. which had expanded intervention
under the former 24(a) (3) beyond the strict pro interessesuo model it embodied.");
Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that court interprets Rule 24 broadly in favor of intervention);
United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that application of Rule 24 is to be guided by practical considerations), vacated sub nom.
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Sagebrush
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The rule was amended
in 1966 in an effort . . . to permit courts to look at practical considerations in
determining whether an absentee seeking intervention is being adequately represented."); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that 1966
amendments were designed to eliminate scissoring effect whereby petitioner who
could show inadequate representation was thereby thrust against blade that he
would therefore not be bound by judgment, and to recognize decisions that had
construed property so broadly as to make surplusage of adjective); Nuesse v.
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We know from the recent amendments to the civil rules that in the intervention area the 'interest' test is primarily a
practical guide to disposing of lawsuits .... "); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States,
379 F.2d 818, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1967) ("[T]he Advisory Committee, unsatisfied with
the former Rules which too frequently defined application in terms of rigid legal
concepts . . . as well as court efforts in applying them, deliberately set out on a
more pragmatic course."); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 105 FR.D. 106, 109 (D.D.C. 1985) (recognizing that "the 1966 amendments
to Rule 24 were designed to liberalize the right to intervene in federal actions"); see
also MOORE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[1] [b] ("The inquiry required under Rule
24(a) (2) is a flexible one, and a practical analysis of the facts and circumstances of
each case is appropriate."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1904 ("It frequently has
been said of Rule 24, as it is of the Civil Rules generally, that it is to be given a
liberal construction."); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 405
(1967) (stating that revision of Rule 24 was intended to "drive beyond the narrow
notion of an interest in specific property"); Laycock, supra note 25, at 112 (stating
that Rule 24 was amended to permit courts to examine practical consequences of
remedy chosen); Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 ("This amendment broadened and
made more flexible the 'unduly restrictive' original rule."). Although courts
should "apply the rule with thoughtful consideration of the objectives it is intended to serve," courts should also take into account the interests of the parties in
the prompt disposition of their action and of the public in the efficient administration of justice. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1904.
51. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (acknowledging that Rule
24(a) (2) has led to "anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals"); Conservation
Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1992)
(stating that case law regarding interest requirement of Rule 24 "varies substantially between courts"); United States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410,
412 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that general rules and past precedents do not provide
dependable guidance); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d
185, 187 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts have not yet adopted uniform stan-
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stitutes an "interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

52
subject of the action" that is sufficient to allow an applicant to intervene.

B.

Lack of Clear Definition of "Interest in the Subject Matter of the Litigation"

The difficulty in defining what constitutes an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action stems in part
from a lack of clear Supreme Court precedent on the issue. 53 In four
dard for determining who is real party in interest); United States v. 36.96 Acres of
Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (noting that majority's decision conflicts with past precedent and authority); Smuck, 408 F.2d at
179 (stating that "general rules and past decisions cannot provide uniformly dependable guides"); MooRE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[2] [d] (describing lack of
consensus regarding interest requirement between circuits); Greenbaum, supra
note 8, at 914 ("Unfortunately, courts disagree significantly about the meaning of
the interest requirement."); Tobias, supra note 3, at 323-25 (describing different
interpretations of Rule 24(a) (2) among circuit courts); Tobias, supra note 6, at 432
("Federal judges have encountered many problems delineating precisely what applicants must show to intervene of right."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 283 (noting
that there are "widely varying interpretations" of Rule 24(a) requirements).
52. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 n.21 ("The Courts of Appeals have
reached varying conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of right
must [her or] himself possess standing."); Security Ins. Co., 69 F.3d at 1380 ("The
'interest' required by Rule 24(a) (2) has never been defined with particular precision."); see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[2] [a] ("[T]here is no authoritative definition of precisely what kinds of interest satisfy the requirements of the
rule."); WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 26, § 1908 ("There is not as yet any clear definition, either from the Supreme Court or from the lower courts, of the nature of the
'interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action."'
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2))); Tobias, supra note 6, at 432 ("Numerous
courts and commentators have recognized that the federal judiciary has experienced considerable difficulty in defining the interest necessary to satisfy Rule
24(a) (2) since the time of its 1966 amendment.").
Court decisions addressing the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) have
differed significantly. Compare Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 826 ("Rule 24 is broadly
construed in favor of applicants for intervention."), United States v. Hooker Chem.
& Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) ("As amended, Rule 24(a) (2) is
a nontechnical directive to courts that provides the flexibility necessary 'to cover
the multitude of possible intervention situations.'" (quoting Restor-A-Dent Dental
Labs., Inc. v. Certified Alloy Prods., Inc., 725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1984))), Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 527 ("This court stated that 'Rule 24 traditionally
has received a liberal construction in favor of applications for intervention."'
(quoting Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630
(9th Cir. 1982))), and Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (" '[O]bviously tailored to fit ordinary
civil litigation, these provisions [of Rule 24] require other than literal application
in atypical cases.'" (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765,
767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc))), with Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that applicant must show "direct, significant, and legally protectable" interest), 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 859 (requiring interest greater than
standing to sue before intervention will be granted), and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring interest
equal to standing before intervention will be granted).
53. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1908 (noting that Supreme Court has
not given clear definition of nature of "'interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action"' (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) (2))); Tobias,
supra note 6, at 432 ("The Supreme Court has rarely addressed Rule 24(a) (2), and
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decisions dealing with Rule 24(a) (2), the Supreme Court has bounced between narrow constructions that require a strong interest and broad interpretations that require a less concrete interest.
In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 54 the Supreme
Court held that a private business with an interest in the solvency of a
corporation to be formed pursuant to a consent decree in an antitrust suit
55
could intervene in the district court action to approve that decree.
Three years prior to the Cascadedecision, the Supreme Court had directed
a district court to order El Paso Natural Gas Company to divest itself of the
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation because its acquisition of that corporation violated the Clayton Act. 56 After remand to the district court,
Cascade sought to intervene, stating that Pacific Northwest had been its
sole supplier of gas and that it had an interest in the ability of the company to be formed by divestiture to supply gas. 57 After finding that the
1966 amendment to Rule 24 could be applied to the case, the Court held
that Cascade could intervene under the new Rule 24(a) (2).58 Although
the Court did not explicitly state why Cascade satisfied Rule 24's interest
requirement, it seemed to imply that an intervenor does not have to
demonstrate a concrete right conferred by law as an interest. 59
when it has, the opinions have been peculiarly fact-bound, affording minimal guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 283
(noting that "a paucity of Supreme Court decisions on intervention of right [has]
resulted in widely varying interpretations of the Rule 24(a) requirements").
54. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
55. See id. at 136 ("[W~e conclude that the new Rule 24(a)(2) is broad
enough to include Cascade also .... ). The Court also allowed the State of California and a private entity, Southern California Edison, to intervene under the old
Rule 24, which was still in force during the proceeding, because they were "so
situated" geographically as to be "adversely affected" within the meaning of Rule
24(a) (3) by a merger that reduced the competitive factor in natural gas available
to residents of California. See id. at 135.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); see Cascade, 386 U.S. at 131 ("When this case
was here the last time, we held that the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline

Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Company violated § 7 of the Clayton Act; and
we directed the District Court 'to order divestiture without delay."' (quoting

United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964))).
57. See Cascade, 386 U.S. at 133 ("Cascade Natural Gas is a distributor in Oregon and Washington, and its sole supplier of natural gas was Pacific Northwest and
will be the New Company created under the divestiture plan."). Cascade claimed
that there had been an unfair division of gas reserves between El Paso and the New
Company, that El Paso had set onerous prices and conditions on sales by the New
Company, and that El Paso had sold stock held by Pacific Northwest that had given
it access to the Canadian gas supply. See id.
58. See id. at 136 (holding that 1966 amendment of Rule 24(a) (2) was "broad
enough to include Cascade also"). Even though the new Rule was enacted while
the appeal was pending, the Court held that it applied to all "'further proceedings'
in pending actions." Id.
59. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 432-33 ("In the 1967 case of Cascade Natural
Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the Court read the Rule broadly and granted
intervention of right, implying that a particular equitable or legal interest is unnecessary to satisfy the Rule.").
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Five years later, the Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation of the
interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2) in Donaldsonv. United States,60 holding that
a taxpayer could not intervene of right in a proceeding to enforce subpoenas from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) against a third person. 6 1 In
Donaldson, the IRS was investigating past tax returns of the applicant, and
it served summonses on the applicant's former employer, Acme, to provide records and testimony concerning the applicant's tax liability. 62 Don-

aldson obtained a preliminary injunction restraining his employer from
providing the information until a court of competent jurisdiction ordered
compliance, but the IRS quickly filed an action to enforce the summonses. 6 3 Donaldson filed a motion to intervene in this action under
Rule 24(a) (2), claiming an interest in the records of payments from Acme
to him, but the court denied the motion. 64 The Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of intervention, finding that Donaldson did not have a sufficient interest in the subject of the litigation to intervene. 65 The Court
held that to satisfy the interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2), an applicant must
66
have a "significantly protectable interest."
60. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
61. See id. at 531 ("We therefore hold that the taxpayer's interest is not
enough and is not of sufficient magnitude for us to conclude that he is to be
allowed to intervene.").
62. See id. at 518-19. The applicant, Kevin L. Donaldson, allegedly had
worked as a performer for the Acme Circus Operating Company, Inc. under a
different name. See id. at 518. The IRS was investigating Donaldson's tax returns
for the years 1964-1967, and pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, it summoned Acme and
its accountant to provide, among other things, applications for employment, any
other records containing background data including Social Security number, that
Donaldson had given to Acme, all contracts between Donaldson and Acme, Forms
1099 and W-2 issued to Donaldson, and checks and vouchers relating to payments
to Donaldson. See id. at 519.
63. See id. at 519-20. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, through a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, restrained Acme and its accountant from complying with the summonses "until such
time as an order of a court of competent jurisdiction has been issued requiring
compliance." Id. at 520. The IRS, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a),
filed petitions in the same court to enforce the summonses. See id.
64. See id. at 521. In his motion, Donaldson also alleged that the IRS was
guilty of bad faith in conducting its investigation and that the summonses were not
issued for any purpose within the scope of the statute authorizing them. See id.
Donaldson also alleged that the summonses violated his rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, but he did not
argue this issue before the Supreme Court. See id.
65. See id. at 531 ("We therefore hold that the taxpayer's interest is not
enough and is not of sufficient magnitude for us to conclude that he is to be
allowed to intervene."); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1908 (pointing out
that records sought by subpoenas were employer's routine business records in
which Donaldson had no proprietary interest and regarding which he could make
no claim of privilege, and that Donaldson only had interest because employer's
records presumably contained details of payments to him by Acme that would be
significant for tax purposes).
66. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531 ("What is obviously meant [by Rule 24(a) (2)] is
a significantly protectable interest."). The Court stated that taxpayers may have
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The Supreme Court next dealt with Rule 24 in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of America.67 The Court did not directly address the interest prong
of Rule 24(a) (2), but it seemed to imply that an applicant does not need
to show standing to sue to show an interest in the litigation sufficient to
intervene. 68 In Trbovich, the Secretary of Labor had instituted an action
under section 402(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 69 to set aside the election of officers of the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA). 70 Trbovich, a member of UMWA,
filed the grievance that led the Secretary to initiate the action and sought
to intervene in the Secretary's action under Rule 24(a) (2). 7 1 The lower
court denied his motion to intervene, stating that the LMRDA gave the
Secretary the exclusive right to bring an action challenging a union election. 72 Even though Trbovich would not have had standing to sue under
the LMRDA, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of intervention, stat-

significantly protectable interests in employers' records if they could claim a privilege or an abuse of process by the IRS. See id.
67. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
68. See id. at 539. The Secretary of Labor did not contest the sufficiency of
Trbovich's interest before the Supreme Court. See id. at 538. Instead, he claimed
that he adequately represented Trbovich's interests, and therefore Trbovich could
not satisfy the fourth prong of Rule 24(a) (2). See id. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that Trbovich did satisfy the fourth prong because he might disagree with the Secretary's tactics and arguments. See id.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1994).
70. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 529. The Secretary alleged that the election violated the reporting and disclosure law by failing to use secret ballots, allowing
campaigning at the polls, barring observers from monitoring polling places and
the counting of ballots, subjecting members to retaliation for their election activities, failing to hold elections in some locales and promoting the campaigns of incumbents with union assets. See id. at 529 n.1. The Secretary sought an order
requiring a new election under his supervision. See id. at 529.
71. See id. Trbovich sought to intervene for three reasons. He wanted to urge
two additional grounds for setting aside the election, and he sought certain safeguards to be used in any new election that might be held. See id. at 529-30. He also
wanted to present evidence and argument to support the Secretary's challenge to
the election. See id. at 530.
72. See id. ("The District Court denied his motion for leave to intervene, on
the ground that the LMRDA expressly stripped union members of any right to
challenge a union election in the courts, and gave that right exclusively to the
Secretary.").
The LMRDA states that after a union election has been held, a civil suit by the
Secretary of Labor shall be the exclusive remedy for violations of the LMRDA. See
29 U.S.C. § 483. Prior to Trbovich, the Supreme Court held that 29 U.S.C. § 483
prohibited union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election.
See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964) ("Section 402 of Title IV... sets
up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights, by permitting an individual
member to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor challenging the validity of
any election because of violations of Title IV.").
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ing that Trbovich had an interest in "free and democratic union
73
elections."
After Trbovich, the Supreme Court next addressed Rule 24(a)(2) in
Diamond v. Charles.7 4 In Diamond, the Court recognized the circuit split
over whether an applicant needs standing to sue to intervene, but it refused to settle the disagreement. 75 Instead, the concurring justices held
that the "significantly protectable interest" required under Donaldson is a
"direct and concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal protection." 76 In Diamond, a group of physicians filed a class action challenging
the constitutionality of an Illinois abortion law. 77 Dr. Diamond, a pediatrician, filed a motion to intervene as defendant, claiming his interest to be
a conscientious objection to abortions as well as his status as a pediatrician
and a parent of a minor daughter. 78 The district court granted the motion. 79 Eventually, the district court ordered a permanent injunction
against enforcing the law, but only Diamond appealed to the circuit court
and later to the Supreme Court.8° The Supreme Court held that an intervenor's right to appeal a judgment "in the absence of the party on whose
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the [case or controversy] requirements of Art. III,"
but it found that Diamond could not make such a showing to maintain his
73. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539 ("Such a complaint, filed by the member who
initiated the entire enforcement proceeding, should be regarded as sufficient to
warrant relief in the form of intervention under Rule 24(a) (2).").
74. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
75. See id. at 68-69 (" [T] he precise relationship between the interest required
to satisfy the Rule and the interests required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in the Courts of'Appeals. We need not decide today whether a party
seeking to intervene . . .must satisfy ... also the requirements of Art. III.").
76. Id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Clearly, Donaldson'srequirement of
a 'significantly protectable interest' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is
accorded some degree of legal protection.").
77. See id. at 57-58. The physicians provided obstetric, gynecologic and abortion services in Illinois, and they alleged that enforcement of the abortion law
deprived them of their rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
The Illinois Abortion Law, 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 81/21 to 81/34 (West 1983),
prescribed the standard of care a physician must exercise when performing an
abortion of a viable fetus and a possibly viable fetus. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 59. It
also required a physician to inform a patient whenever he prescribed an "abortifacient." See id. at 60.
78. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 57-58.
79. See id. at 58 (noting that district court believed Diamond had satisfied
requirements for intervention). The district court did not indicate whether the
intervention was permissive or of right, and it did not describe how Dr. Diamond's
interests were sufficient to satisfy Rule 24(a) (2). See id. Dr. Diamond also filed a
motion to be appointed as guardian ad litem for fetuses who survive abortion, but
the court denied that motion. See id. at 57-58.
80. See id. at 61. The State of Illinois did not appeal the injunction, and thus
Diamond was the sole appellant. See id. Illinois did file a "letter of interest" with
the Supreme Court. See id. Because Illinois did not appear as an appellant, the
Court had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by Diamond. See id.
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appeal.8 ' In a concurring opinion,Justice O'Connor stated that Diamond
should never have been allowed to intervene because he did not have an
interest in the litigation that satisfied the second prong of Rule 24(a) (2).82
This is because the Illinois abortion law did not "vest physicians, parents,
or daughters with 'significantly protectable interest[s]." 83 Thus, Diamond
seems to stand for the proposition that applicants must be able to claim a
right protected under some law before they can satisfy the interest requirement of Rule 24(a) (2).
The lack of consistent Supreme Court guidance has left lower federal
courts to flesh out Rule 24(a)(2), and in struggling to define "interest,"
judges have used a wide range of interpretations. 84 If the courts' different
81. Id. at 68. The Court stated that "[a]lthough intervenors are considered
parties entitled ... to seek review by this Court an intervenor's right to continue a
suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. II."
Id. (citation omitted).
82. See id. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Dr. Diamond was not a proper
intervenor in the Court of Appeals."). Justice O'Connor stated, "This Court's decision in Donaldson... establishes that Diamond's asserted interests in the provisions
at issue in the Court of Appeals fall well outside the ambit of Rule 24(a) (2), and it
is likewise apparent that he was not entitled to permissive intervention under Rule
24(b) (2)." Id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I discern nothing in any of the
provisions of the Illinois Abortion Law that were challenged in the Court of Appeals to suggest that Illinois meant to vest physicians, parents, or daughters with
'significantly protectable interests."').
84. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 432 ("The Supreme Court has rarely addressed
Rule 24(a) (2), and when it has, the opinions have been peculiarly fact-bound, affording minimal guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest."); Vreeland,
supra note 2, at 283 (noting that "a paucity of Supreme Court decisions on intervention of right [has] resulted in widely varying interpretations of the Rule 24(a)
requirements"). One commentator wrote:
This relative dearth of Supreme Court precedent and its fact-intensive
nature have meant that the lower federal courts have assumed primary
responsibility for articulating the interest requirement and for applying
Rule 24(a) (2). Circuit and district judges have exhibited great difficulty
defining interest with significant clarity, despite the thousands of opportunities available to them.
Tobias, supra note 6, at 434.
The following are examples of contrasting interpretations of the interest requirement. Compare United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.
1986) ("Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for intervention."),
vacated sub nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370

(1987), United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir.
1984) ("As amended, Rule 24(a)(2) is a nontechnical directive to courts that provides the flexibility necessary 'to cover the multitude of possible intervention situations."' (quoting Restor-A-Dent Dental Labs., Inc. v. Certified Alloy Prods., Inc.,
725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1984))), Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d
525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) ("This court stated that 'Rule 24 traditionally has received
a liberal construction in favor of applications for intervention."' (quoting Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.
1982))), and Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("'[O]bviously
tailored to fit ordinary civil litigation, these provisions [of Rule 24] require other
than literal application in atypical cases."' (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Al-
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articulations of the interest requirement were placed on a spectrum, at
one end would be those courts that characterize it as flexible or open
ended. 85 This interpretation has been expressed most frequently by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth
Circuits. 8 6 In their opinions, the judges often consider the practical consequences of granting or denying intervention, and they frequently state
that the 1966 amendment to Rule 24 was intended to broaden the Rule's
application. 8 7 Many of these judges also quote the decision in Nuesse v.
lendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc))), with Keith v. Daley,
764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that applicant must show "direct,
significant, and legally protectable" interest), United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land,
754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring interest greater than standing to sue
before intervention will be granted), and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring interest equal to
standing before intervention will be granted).
85. See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d
1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that interest test is practical guide); Sierra
Club v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)
(noting that Rule 24(a) (2) is construed broadly in favor of intervention); United
States v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Fifth
Circuit precedent establishes that 'the inquiry under subsection (a) (2) is a flexible
one, which focuses on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
application ... [and] intervention of right must be measured by a practical rather
than technical yardstick.'" (quoting United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 841 (5th Cir. 1975))); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866
F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that interest test is practical guide to disposing of lawsuits as efficiently as possible); Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 826 ("In applying
this test [for interest requirement] we are guided primarily by practical considerations."); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 527 (stating that Rule 24 is to be given
liberal construction and court is to look at practical considerations in deciding
motions to intervene of right); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir.
1969) ("[A] more instructive approach is to let our construction [of Rule 24] be
guided by the policies behind the 'interest' requirement."); Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700
("[T]he 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and
due process."); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824-25 (5th Cir.
1967) (stating that to effect intentions of Rule's drafters court must examine practical considerations); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
105 F.R.D. 106, 109 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[T]he approach taken by this jurisdiction in
determining whether a potential intervenor as of fight satisfies the 'interest' requirement... has been to look to the 'practical consequences' of denying intervention, rather than to 'revert to a narrow formulation ....
' (quoting Nuesse, 385
F.2d at 700)).
86. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 435 ("[T]he principal proponents of these
views have been the judges in the United States Courts of Appeals for the District
of Columbia and the Ninth Circuits.").
87. See Stringellow, 783 F.2d at 826 (citing advisory committee note to 1966
amendment to support its holding that application of interest test is guided by
practical considerations); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., 713 F.2d at 527 ("The rule was
amended in 1966 in an effort, according to the advisory committee note, to permit
courts to look at practical considerations in determining whether an absentee
seeking intervention is being adequately represented."); Smuck, 408 F.2d at 178
("The 1966 amendments were designed to eliminate the scissoring effect [of the
former rule]... and to recognize the decisions which had construed 'property' so
broadly as to make surplusage of the adjective."); Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (stating
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Camp,8 8 the seminal case for this interpretation, and state that "the interest test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as
many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and
due process."8 9 These judges also generally reject the notion that interest
requires a specific right conferred by law.90
Further down the spectrum towards narrower articulations of the interest requirement are those courts that require a "direct," "substantial" or
that amendments to Rule 24 suggest that interest requirement is practical consideration); Atlantis Dev. Corp., 379 F.2d at 824-25 (stating that in amending Rule 24
drafters "deliberately set out on a more pragmatic course"); see also Tobias, supra
note 6, at 435 ("[The courts] examine the pragmatic implications of denying intervention and the policies underlying the 1966 amendment, occasionally stating that
the Advisory Committee meant to liberalize intervention of right.").
88. 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
89. Id. at 700; see Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1996) (being
"mindful" of fact that interest test is practical guide); Forest Conservation Council,66
F.3d at 1496 (noting circuit's precedent incorporating Nuesse language); United
States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1162 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that court
should be mindful of Nuesse interpretation of Rule 24); Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957
F.2d 1199, 1204 n.10 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that property or transaction need not
be defined narrowly); Worlds v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv.,
929 F.2d 591, 594 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that court's holding is consistent with
Nuesse); Pujol v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 877 F.2d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that Rules are intended to involve as many parties as is compatible with
due process); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jennings, 816 F.2d 1488, 1491 (10th
Cir. 1987) (quoting opinion in Nuesse); Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 729 (4th Cir.
1986) (stating that liberal interpretation of Rule 24 is preferable); Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting language from Nuesse); Security
Exch. Comm'n v. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 949 (8th Cir. 1983) (relying
on language from Nuesse); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 644 F.2d 849, 850 n.3
(10th Cir. 1981) (contrasting Nuesse interpretation with other decisions); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting
Nuesseas leading case for practical interpretation); Smuck, 408 F.2d at 179 (quoting
decision in Nuesse).
90. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S.
129, 132-36 (1967) (allowing private party to intervene in action under antitrust
law between United States and defendant); Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at
1496 (stating that no specific legal or equitable interest need be established);
Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1162 (noting that court has rejected arguments that
inchoate interests which have not yet vested are insufficient to intervene); Sierra
Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that interest
of representatives of forest products industry in existing lumber contracts was "too
speculative and generalized to satisfy Rule 24" where litigation involved potential
bar on particular kind of forest management); Ceres Gulf, 957 F.2d at 1204 (stating
that intervenor has interest in managing federal administrative program); Smuck,
408 F.2d at 178-80 (holding that parent's interest in child's welfare is sufficient to
intervene); Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 700 (stating that state official's interest in effectuating state's public policy was sufficient to intervene); Independent PetrochemicalCorp.,
105 F.R.D. at 110 (noting that "the determination of whether or not a party should
be allowed to intervene as of right should be guided not by 'a myopic fixation
upon interest"' (quoting Smuck, 408 F.2d at 179)); see also Tobias, supra note 6, at
435 ("Moreover, many of the courts expressly reject the notions that interest
means a specific equitable or legal interest or connotes a 'direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings."').
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"legally protectable" interest in the subject of the litigation. 9 1 The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have
employed this interpretation most often. 92 Although they do not require
an applicant to possess standing, they generally require an interest that is
93
recognized and protected by some specific law.
A number of courts have gone one step further and required that an
applicant have an interest equivalent to standing to satisfy Rule 24(a) (2).94
91. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971) (requiring
intervenor to demonstrate "significantly protectable interest"); Sierra Club v. City
of San Antonio, 115 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring interest to be direct,
cognizable and legally protectable); Ozee v. American Council on Gift Annuities,
Inc., 110 F.3d 1082, 1096 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring applicant to have direct, substantial and legally protectable interest); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103
F.3d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1997) (approving of denial of intervention based on lack
of direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest); Edwards v. City of Houston,
78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that to demonstrate interest relating to
property or subject matter of litigation sufficient to support intervention of right,
applicant must have direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in proceedings); Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1495 (stating that applicant has sufficient interest if remedy sought will have direct, immediate and harmful effect on
applicant's legally protectable interest); Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207 (stating that applicant must have "direct, substantial, legally protectable" interest); Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that interest
relating to transaction required for intervention is direct, substantial and legally
protectable interest in proceedings); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that intervention of right
still requires direct, substantial and legally protectableinterest in proceedings);
Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th
Cir. 1982) ("Intervention of right must be supported by a 'direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceeding.'"); Meridian Homes Corp. v. Nicholas
W. Prassas & Co., 683 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that applicant did not
have "direct and substantial, and therefore legally protectable, interest"); Heyman
v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 615 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1980) (hesitating
to recognize remote possibility of "direct and substantial" interest under Rule 24).
92. See Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 916 (stating that Fifth and Eleventh Circuits allow only real party of interest to intervene); Tobias, supra note 6, at 435
(noting that Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' treatment of interest requirement "lies at the more restrictive end of the spectrum").
93. See, e.g., Ozee, 110 F.3d at 1096 (stating that interest of applicant must "be
one that the law recognizes as his"); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25
F.3d 1174, 1185 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that applicant must possess more than
mere economic interest in outcome of litigation); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring applicant for
intervention to demonstrate legally cognizable interest); Getty Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 865 F.2d 270, 275 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that court
looks to substantive law to determine if applicant has necessary interest); Baker v.
Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that applicant's interest must be
"one which the substantive law requires as belonging to or being owned by the
applicant"); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d at 464 (stating that Rule 24 requires interest of applicant to be "one which the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant"); Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 916
(noting that some courts require applicant to be real party in interest "who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right").
94. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515,
1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[A] movant for leave to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
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In justifying its requirement that an applicant have standing, one court
stated that "because a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal
footing with the original parties to the suit, he [or she] must satisfy the
standing requirements imposed on those parties." 95 Another court stated
that standing case law helps to "define the type of interest that the intervenor must assert." 96 Critics of these courts, however, have contended
that standing is irrelevant and that equating the interest in Rule 24(a) (2)
97
with standing is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
must have Article III standing to participate in proceedings before the district
court."); PanolaLand Buying Ass'n, 844 F.2d at 1509 (discussing relation of standing to intervention under Rule 24); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that interest must be so direct that applicant would have fight to
maintain claim for relief sought); Cook, 763 F.2d at 1470 ("[A]n intervenor of
right, just like an ordinary plaintiff, must have standing."); Southern Christian
Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
applicant could not intervene because he lacked protectable interest sufficient to
confer standing); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d at 464 (stating that intervention has been held subject to standing requirement that presence of harm to party
does not permit him or her to assert rights of third parties in order to obtain
redress for her or himself); see also Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 916 (stating that
Seventh and Eighth Circuits require applicant to have right to maintain claim for

relief sought).
95. City of Cleveland, 17 F.3d at 1517. In City of Cleveland, several owners of a
nuclear power plant asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to suspend
the antitrust conditions included in the plants' operating licenses on the grounds
that the actual cost of electricity from the plants was higher than the cost of electricity from alternative sources. See id. at 1516. The NRC denied their requests,
and the owners subsequently filed a petition in the district court. See id. The Alabama Electric Cooperative (AEC) filed a motion to intervene of right, claiming
that the court's decision might set a precedent that would adversely affect a court
order the AEC had previously obtained. See id. The court of appeals, finding that
Article III of the United States Constitution placed a "gloss" upon Rule 24, denied
intervention because the AEC lacked a claim that it had standing to assert. See id.
at 1517.
96. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The standing cases, however, are relevant to help define the type of interest that the intervenor must assert."). Although it found standing cases helpful, the Chiles court
did not require the applicant to demonstrate standing to satisfy the interest requirement. See id. The court acknowledged the disparate treatment of Rule 24 by
the circuit courts, and it attributed the confusion to the fact that standing concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of a court. See id. The court stated:
The standing doctrine ensures that ajusticiable case and controversy ex-

ists between the parties. Intervention under Rule 24 presumes that there
is ajusticiable case into which an individual wants to intervene. The focus therefore of a Rule 24 inquiry is whether the intervenor has a legally
protectable interest in the litigation. It is in this context that the standing
cases are relevant, for an intervenor's interest must be a particularized
interest rather than a general grievance.
Id.
97. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 441 ("[T] he sheer volume of cases that do not
allude to standing may testify to the minimal relevance that standing should receive .... ). This commentator also noted that the Supreme Court has implied
that standing is not necessary to intervene:
Trbovich... could be read as an implicit rejection by the Supreme Court
of the application of standing to intervention of right, and an analogous
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At the most restrictive end of the spectrum, one court has required an
applicant to show an interest greater than standing to intervene.9 8 In
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land,99 Congress had authorized the Secretary of the Interior to condemn a power company's land for inclusion in a
National Lakeshore.1 00 The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order denying
intervention to a public interest group that sought to challenge the condemnation, stating that the applicant's interest "must be greater than the
interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement."10 1
The disparate treatment of Rule 24(a) (2) by the circuit courts has
made adjudication of motions to intervene of right difficult.' 0 2 Unfortunately, the confusion is likely to remain unless the Supreme Court hands
down an authoritative definition of the Rule's interest prong.
III.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF SIERA CLUB V. CTY OF SAN ANToNIo

The Sierra Club's lawsuit against the City of San Antonio centered
around the Edwards Aquifer, a natural underground water supply located
allusion appears in the Court's 1980 decision, Bryant v. Yellen. Similarly,
in Diamond, the majority's phrasing of the relevant question as whether
applicants "must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a) (2), but
also the requirements of Article III," and its observation that Dr. Diamond might have relied on the state's standing, had Illinois chosen to
appeal, could be endorsements of intervention at the trial court level by
entities without standing.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 69 (1986)).
98. See United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985)
("The interest of a proposed intervenor, however, must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement."). The dissenting opinion stated
that the majority's holding was contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Trbovich. See id. at 860-61 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
99. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
100. See id. at 858 (citing statutes that gave Secretary of Interior power to acquire and preserve for public use certain portions of land known as Indiana
Dunes).
101. Id. at 859. The court stated that this requirement was consistent with the
"significantly protectable interest" language in the Supreme Court's decision in
Donaldson. See id. The court also stated that the applicant's aesthetic and environmental interests were not direct, substantial or legally protectable, and therefore
did not warrant intervention. See id.
102. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Mosbacher,
966 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting "lack of a clear standard" to guide court
when judging sufficiency of applicant's interest); Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, 173
F.R.D. 17, 25 (D.N.H. 1997) (stating that "no bright line of demarcation" exists
and that court must decide motions on case by case basis); Greenbaum, supranote
8, at 914 (acknowledging disagreement among courts over meaning of interest
requirement); Tobias, supra note 6, at 432 ("The Supreme Court has rarely addressed Rule 24(a)(2), and when it has, the opinions have been peculiarly factbound, affording minimal guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest.");
Vreeland, supra note 2, at 283 ("[A] paucity of Supreme Court decisions on intervention of right [has] resulted in widely varying interpretations of the Rule 24(a)
requirements.").
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near San Antonio.1 03 The City of San Antonio receives its water supply
exclusively from the Edwards Aquifer, and other parts of central Texas rely
on the aquifer as a primary source of water. 10 4 At two locations, the San
Marcos Springs and the Comal Springs, the aquifer discharges water into
the Guadalupe River Basin. 10 5 In the San Marcos Springs and Comal
Springs areas, the aquifer is home to several plant and animal species
which are designated as endangered or threatened under the Endangered
10 6
Species Act.
103. See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 115 F.3d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reversing order prohibiting Texas from intervening in suit to enjoin use of aquifer); Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1997) (involving appeal from preliminary injunction limiting use of aquifer by city); see
alsoJerry Needham, Water Supply Major Concern-CompetingDemands Threaten Supply
from Edwards Acquifer, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Feb. 2, 1997, at 8G, available in
1997 WL 3159927 (noting that San Antonio has been involved in lawsuits concerning Edwards Aquifer since 1991).
The Edwards Aquifer is an underground conduit for water in central Texas.
See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Sierra Club Weighs Options After Class Action Setback, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Nov. 23, 1996, at B13, available in 1996 WL 3542967
(describing geography of Edwards Aquifer). The Sierra Club's lawsuit concerned
a segment of the aquifer that measured 3600 square miles in area and spanned 175
miles from Kinney County to Hays County. See id. This segment contains between
24 million to 48 million acre-feet of water and feeds into over six counties. See
Aquifer Ecosystems Can Make or Break Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20, 1997, at
12A, available in 1997 WL 2670917 (discussing size and use of Edwards Aquifer).
104. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 791 (stating that San Antonio relies exclusively
on Edwards Aquifer for its water). The court also pointed out that the Edwards
Aquifer supplies water to over one million people in San Antonio alone. See id.; see
also Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 (noting that more than one million San Antonio
residents receive water from Edwards Aquifer). In addition to the City of San
Antonio, seven political subdivisions of the State of Texas who own water utilities
in central Texas also rely on the Edwards Aquifer for water. See id. See generally
Court Nullifies Pumping Limits on Waterfrom Edwards Aquifer, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 2, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 4838990 [hereinafter Court Nullifies
Pumping Limits] ("The aquifer is the sole source of drinking water for the city of
San Antonio, and other towns and counties in the region that also rely on it.");
Haurwitz, supra note 103, at B13 ("The aquifer furnishes well water for... agricultural lands and military bases. Its primary natural outlets... provide much of the
flow for the Guadalupe River, also a major source for municipal, industrial and
agricultural purposes."); Needham, supra note 103, at 86 ("Along with sustaining
the [protected] species, downstream users and San Antonio, the aquifer also supplies irrigation farmers in Medina and Uvalde counties west of the city.").
105. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 791; see also Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Court Blocks

Order to Trim Use of Aquifer,

AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,

Sept. 11, 1996, at B1,

available in 1996 WL 3443864 (noting that aquifer feeds springs at San Marcos);
Haurwitz, supra note 103, at B13 (stating that one of aquifer's natural outlets is San
Marcos Springs).
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994) (establishing protection of endangered
and threatened species and describing procedure for designating species as endangered or threatened); see Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 ("The springs provide a home
to four 'endangered species' . . . and one 'threatened species'...."); Sierra Club,
112 F.3d at 791 ("In the area of the San Marcos and Comal Springs, the aquifer is
home to five plant and animal species designated as endangered or threatened
. .. .
.).
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The Sierra Club filed its suit against the City of San Antonio and several other defendants duringJune 1996 in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas. 10 7 In its complaint, the Sierra Club alleged that the defendants were "taking" endangered and threatened species in violation of the Endangered Species Act by reducing springflows
from the Edwards Aquifer below levels needed to sustain the species. 0 8
This action was actually one in a series of lawsuits filed since 1991 by the
Sierra Club in an effort to protect the Edwards Aquifer. 10 9
In its lawsuit, the Sierra Club asked the court to enjoin the City of San
Antonio and several other aquifer users from reducing the water supply
The Edwards Aquifer contains three endangered animal species, one
threatened animal species and one endangered plant species. See Sierra Club, 115
F.3d at 313. The San Marcos gambusia, the Texas blind salamander and the fountain darter are endangered animal species, and the San Marcos salamander is a
threatened species. See id. The Texas wild-rice is an endangered plant species. See
id. See generally 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1997) (designating animal species as endangered or threatened); 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1997) (designating plant species as endangered or threatened).
107. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 311 (discussing history of Sierra Club's lawsuit); Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 789 (describing actions taken by Sierra Club during
litigation). The other defendants included San Antonio Water Systems, the City of
Hondo, the City of Uvalde, the City of Leon Valley, Redland Stone Products Company, Southwest Research Institute, United Services Automobile Association and
the Bexar Metropolitan Water District. See id. These defendants were sued on
their own behalf and on behalf of all municipal, industrial, commercial, domestic
and livestock pumpers in their respective counties. See id.
Interestingly, the Sierra Club's lawsuit was financed by the Guadalupe Blanco
River Authority (GBRA). See David A. Richelieu, Not All Aquifer Issues Can Be Settled
in Court, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Dec. 3, 1996, at IB, available in 1996 WL
11507795 (reporting on funding and chronology of Sierra Club's litigation). The
GBRA sells water flowing from the San Marcos Springs and Comal Springs to customers downstream from the springs, including a chemical plant. See id.
108. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 (describing allegations made by Sierra
Club); Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 792 (discussing contents of Sierra Club's complaint).
See generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. The relevant portion
of the Endangered Species Act provides:
Except as provided in sections 153 5(g) (2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to ...take any such species within the
United States or the territorial sea of the United States.
Id. § 1538(a) (1) (B).
109. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 792 (discussing prior suit by Sierra Club concerning aquifer). In a prior action, Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 81 F.3d 155 (5th Cir.
1995), the Sierra Club had sued the Secretary of the Interior and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act. See Sierra Club, 112
F.3d at 792. In that suit, the Sierra Club claimed that the Fish and Wildlife Service
had failed to adopt an "adequate recovery plan" as required by the Endangered
Species Act. See id. The Act provides that "[t]he Secretary shall develop and implement plans (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as 'recovery plans') for the
conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to this section ....
" 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0. After several appeals, the Fifth
Circuit dismissed the suit as moot after the Fish and Wildlife Service published a
revised recovery plan. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 792.
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below certain levels that are harmful to the protected species. 1 10 The Sierra Club claimed that the annual input of water to the Edwards Aquifer
had been less than the annual discharge of water for several years, causing
the water level of the aquifer to fall."' The Sierra Club also claimed to
have direct evidence of the deaths of protected species and emaciation of
other plant and animal life due to the low spring flows, and it alleged that
a causal link existed between the low spring flows and the defendants'
1 12
pumping of water from the aquifer.
After filing its complaint, the Sierra Club moved for a preliminary
injunction to limit the defendants' pumping while the trial was pending,
and on August 23, 1996, the district court granted the injunction. 1 3 On
110. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 ("In the instant action, the Sierra Club
seeks to enjoin various parties who pump water from the aquifer.., from reducing
the springflows below certain levels that the Sierra Club deems harmful to the
spring dwellers."); Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 792 ("The complaint seeks to enjoin
defendants 'to reduce withdrawals from the Edwards by such levels as are necessary
to maintain minimum natural springflows from the Comal and San Marcos Springs
for the conservation and survival of the endangered and threatened species living
at and downstream from those springs."').
111. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 791 (discussing evidence presented at trial
regarding water level of aquifer). Discharge from the aquifer is calculated by adding water withdrawals by pumpers and springflows from the aquifer. See id. In
1996, a severe drought affected the aquifer area, and as a result, the springflow at
Comal Springs fell steadily from April to June before leveling off. See id. The lack
of rainfall contributed to the low input of water into the aquifer. See id.; see also
Needham, supra note 103, at 86 (noting that 18 month drought caused significant
drop in water level).
112. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 791 (describing evidence offered by Sierra
Club). In June 1996, an expert zoologist working for the Sierra Club studied the
Springs areas, and he observed "five or six 'very thin' fountain darters in the uppermost spring run of Comal Springs." Id. A hydrology expert working for the
City of San Antonio stated that he believed the decline in the water level would
stop in August 1996 and that the water level would rise in the fall of 1996. See id. at
791-92. See generally Court Nullifies Pumping Limits, supra note 104, at 3 (stating that
drought conditions and increased water pumping were draining aquifer);
Haurwitz, supra note 103, at B13 ("The Sierra Club contends that without reductions in well pumping, flow from the springs will be insufficient to sustain the rare
species."); Needham, supra note 103, at 86 ("[Glrowing and competing demands
across the region threaten to draw down the Edwards Aquifer faster than rainfall
can replenish it,"); Jerry Needham & Stefanie Scott, State Joining S.A. in Water
Fight-AG's Office to File Motion in Sierra Club Suit, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug.
28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11494973 (stating that testimony from both Sierra
Club's and San Antonio's experts indicated cause-and-effect relationship between
city's pumping and reductions in springflow).
113. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 792 (discussing preliminary injunction received by Sierra Club). The Fifth Circuit noted that in granting the injunction, the
district court stated "an emergency presently exists and takes [sic] of endangered
species are occurring," and that "[w]ithout a fundamental change in the value the
region places on fresh water, a major effort to conserve and reuse Aquifer water,
and implemented plans to import supplemental supplies of water, the region's
quality of life and economic future is imperiled." Id. In its order granting the
injunction, the court limited defendants' pumping from the aquifer to the water
use of 1.2 times the amount used in winter months. See id. The order also required the parties to supply the court and a special master with monthly reports on
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April 30, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded in an interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in grant1 14
ing the injunction and vacated the district court's order.
While the suit was still pending, the Attorney General of Texas filed a
motion on behalf of the State to intervene in four separate and distinct
water usage and other information to keep the court informed. See id. at 793. The
injunction was to remain in effect until the defendants could show that a critical
management plan that would preserve endangered species was operative. See id.
On September 10, 1996, the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction while the appeal was pending. See id. at 792 n.7 ("This court has stayed the injunction pending
appellate review."); Haurwitz, supra note 105 (discussing stay of injunction).
114. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 798 (discussing reasons for vacating preliminary injunction). The Fifth Circuit decided that the Sierra Club failed to prove
one of the four requirements for a preliminary injunction, a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits. See id. at 793; see also Court Nullifies Pumping Limits, supra
note 104 ("Limits on pumping water from the Edwards Aquifer ordered by a federal judge have been struck down by a higher court."). The Sierra Club requested
a rehearing en banc of the circuit court's decision, but its request was denied on
June 20, 1997. SeeJerry Needham, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects Sierra Club Rehearing
Bid, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, June 24, 1997, at IB, available in 1997 WL
3177917 (reporting denial of rehearing en banc).
Interestingly, parts of the majority opinion in the first Sierra Club foreshadow
the Fifth Circuit's decision in the second Sierra Club. In reaching its decision in the
first case, the court identified a number of interests that the State of Texas had in
the regulation of its water resources. See Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 794-95. The court
stated that "[c]onservation of water has always been a paramount concern in
Texas, especially in times, like today, of devastating drought," and that "the State
has the responsibility under the Texas Constitution to preserve and conserve water
resources for the benefit of all Texans." Id. at 794 (citing Barshop v. Medina
County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1996)).
It also pointed out that the Edwards Aquifer "is vital to the general economy and
welfare of the State of Texas." Id. (citing Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 623). In addition
to the state's interests, the court noted that the citizens of Texas had an interest in
the action. See id. The president of the San Antonio Water System testified that
compliance with the district court's order would likely force the city to maintain
water pressures below what state law required for fighting fires. See id. Another
expert testified that the order would necessitate a complete ban on outside watering, which could result in damage to one half of the building foundations in the
city. See id. The court also stated that Texas clearly had an interest in uniform
decisionmaking regarding management of "this finite amount of water." Id. at
794-95.
As early as August 1996, the Texas Attorney General was considering involvement in the suit against the City of San Antonio. See Needham & Scott, supra note
112 (discussing State's plans to intervene in suit). On August 29, 1996, the State of
Texas became involved in the suit by filing an amicus curiae brief with the Fifth
Circuit that urged the court to vacate the preliminary injunction. See Sierra Club,
112 F.3d at 796 (noting portions of State's brief); Michael Holmes, Texas Joins San
Antonio's Side in Edwards Aquifer Court Fight, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 30,
1996, at B6, availablein 1996 WL 3442444 (discussing brief filed by Texas Attorney
General). In its brief, the State argued that federal courts were interfering in a
matter that the state is trying to regulate and that the district court's ruling infringed on state and local authority and on private property rights. See id. The
brief stated, "[tihis contrived scheme will not only diminish the value of vast
amounts of private property of Texas citizens, it will damage the self-governing
powers of the state of Texas and local governments." Id.
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capacities: (1) as the State qua the State of Texas; (2) on behalf of three of
its agencies that regulate state water and wildlife rights; (3) on behalf of
the Texas Department of CriminalJustice (TDCJ); and (4) on behalf of its
citizens as parens patriae.115 The district court allowed the State to intervene on behalf of the TDCJ, but it denied intervention in the other capacities. 116 The State of Texas sought an interlocutory appeal of the district
court decision, and the Fifth Circuit, finding that the decision was a collateral order, allowed the appeal.'1 7 On June 9, 1997, the Fifth Circuit reversed the partial denial of intervention and remanded the case, directing
the district court to grant the state's motion for intervention in its
118
entirety.

IV.

THE

REASONING AND VALIDITY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

A.

The Court's Legal Analysis and Reasoning

In Sierra Club, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the State of Texas
could intervene as of right under Rule 24 in a suit between an environmental group and several municipal governments. 1 9 The court began its
inquiry with an examination of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28
115. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 (discussing Texas Attorney General's motion to intervene). The three water and wildlife agencies are the Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC), the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) and the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA). See id. The
TDCJ pumped water from the Edwards Aquifer to a nearby prison in Hondo,

Texas. See Texas Allowed to Defend Aquifer Users in Lawsuit, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS,

June 12, 1997, at 38A, available in 1997 WL 2676393 (discussing reversal ofjudge's
decision keeping State of Texas from helping defend San Antonio and other Edwards Aquifer pumpers in lawsuit brought by Sierra Club).
The term parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). The ability of a state
to bring a parens patriae action has its roots in the common law concept of the
"royal prerogative," which included the right or responsibility to take care of persons who are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, to take proper care
of themselves and their property. See id. American courts recognized this common law concept as an inherent part of state power, but in the form of a legislative
prerogative. See id. Today, the term refers to the role of the state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under a legal disability. See id. at 600 n.8.
116. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 (discussing lower court's ruling).
117. See id. at 314 ("The denial of intervention is therefore a collateral order
that is immediately appealable.").
118. See id. at 315 ("[W]e reverse the partial denial of intervention and remand with direction to the district court to grant the state's motion for intervention as of right.") (emphasis omitted); see also Court Lets State Join Edwards Aquifer
Case, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 12, 1997, at B4, available in 1997 WL
2827241 (discussing circuit court's opinion and its possible impact on lawsuit).
119. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 312 ("The State of Texas appeals a denial of its
motion to intervene filed pursuant to FED. R. Ctv. P. 24.").
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U.S.C. § 1291.120 It then considered whether Texas satisfied the requirements for intervention of right under Rule 24(a) (2).121
Before it reviewed the district court's order denying intervention, the
Fifth Circuit first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 122 It noted that, in general, a district court's orders are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 only
when they end the litigation on its merits. 123 The court also noted, however, that certain orders, known as collateral orders, are reviewable under
§ 1291 before a final judgment on the merits has been rendered by the
district court. 124 To be considered a collateral order, an order must: (1)
conclusively decide the disputed issue; (2) decide an issue that is entirely
separable from the underlying cause of action; (3) be effectively unreviewable after a final judgment; and (4) be too important to be denied review. 12 5 The court next noted that according to its previous rulings, an
120. See id. at 313 ("Before reaching the merits of the intervention, we must
determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.").
121. See id. at 314 (addressing district court's denial of intervention and noting requirements of Rule 24).
122. See id. at 313-14 (deciding that court could hear Texas's interlocutory
appeal).
123. See id. at 313 ("[A] district court order is appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 if it 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.'" (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945))). Congress granted the circuit courts jurisdiction over appeals from the
district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). The relevant portion states:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
124. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 ("Certain collateral orders are reviewable
immediately under § 1291 .... ).
125. See id. at 313. In Abney v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
because 28 U.S.C. § 1291 does not limit appellate jurisdiction to those final judgments that terminate an action, but only to "final decision [s]," the statute allows
for a collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. 431 U.S. 651, 658
(1977). In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the. Court stated that an order
must possess four characteristics to fall within the collateral order exception: (1) it
must determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in
the action; (2) it must be a final decision of that claim of right; (3) it must be so
independent of the cause itself that appellate consideration cannot be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated; and (4) it must be too important to be denied
review. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The lower courts have refined the collateral
order exception to a three-prong'test to determine when an interlocutory order
may be appealed: (1) it must conclusively determine the disputed issue; (2) it must
resolve an important issue completely severable from the merits of the action; and
(3) it must be effectively unreviewable upon appeal from a final judgment. See,
e.g., Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 967 F.2d 514, 516 (11th Cir. 1992)
(listing three criteria that must be present for order to fall under collateral order
exception); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 769 F.2d 352, 354 (6th Cir.
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order denying intervention of right will be considered a collateral order
126
and thus can be the subject of an interlocutory appeal.
In defense, the Sierra Club contended that pursuant to Stringfellow v.
Concerned Neighbors in Action,1 2 7 the district court's decision to permit

Texas to intervene as the TDCJ only was not "effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment" and, therefore, was not a collateral order. 128 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and distinguished the
facts underlying the Stringfellow decision. 1 29 The court pointed out that
the intervening party in Stringfellow was granted permissive intervention
with several conditions, but in all other respects it could fully participate in
the trial. 130 Therefore, the intervening party had the same rights on ap1985) (stating that three criteria must be shown for collateral order exception to
apply).
126. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313 ("We have recognized previously that an
order denying intervention of fight under Rule 24(a) is appealable as a collateral
order."); see also Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc) ("The denial of a motion to intervene of fight is an appealable final order

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291."); Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1202 n.5 (5th Cir.
1992) (stating that denial of intervention of fight is appealable before final judgment);Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 704 F.2d 206, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that denial of intervention of right is appealable but that denial of permissive
intervention is not unless there is abuse of discretion), affd in part on reh'g, 735

F.2d 923 (1984).
127. 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
128. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 313-14 (discussing Sierra Club's argument that
court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal of district court's order denying
intervention).
In Stringfellow, a group of citizens sought to intervene in an action brought by
the United States and the State of California against parties allegedly responsible
for the release of hazardous wastes at an abandoned hazardous waste disposal site.
See Stringellow, 480 U.S. at 372 (discussing group's claims of substantial interest in
action). The district court granted permissive intervention with three conditions:
(1) the group "could not assert any claim for relief that had not already been
requested by one of the original parties;" (2) the group "could not intervene in the
Government plaintiffs' claim for recovery of the clean-up costs;" and (3) the group
"could not file any motions or conduct its own discovery unless it first conferred

with all the original parties, and then obtained permission to go forward from at
least one of [the parties]." Id. at 373. The circuit court initially dismissed the

group's appeal, stating that the lower court's order was not final and thus could

not be appealed, but it later withdrew that opinion after finding it was inconsistent
with circuit precedent. See id. at 374. The circuit court then reversed the denial of
intervention of right and remanded. See id. The Supreme Court, however, held
that the district court order was not immediately appealable under the collateral
order exception because the group would have the same rights of the parties on
appeal and could challenge the limitations on its intervention before the appellate
court. See id. at 375.
129. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 314 (rejecting Sierra Club's argument based
on Stringfellow that district court's order was not appealable).
130. See id. The court noted that in Stringfellow:

[Tihe district court denied the petitioner's motion to intervene as of
fight but granted its application for permissive intervention with the following conditions: (1) the petitioner could not assert any claims for relief
that had not already been requested by one of the original parties; (2) it
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peal as all other parties, and the limitations on intervention were reviewable on appeal.1 3 1 To contrast Stringfellow with the case before it, the Fifth
Circuit pointed out that in Stringellow the district court limited a single
party's rights, while the order allowing intervention only as the TDCJ completely denied the rights of different parties. 13 2 The fact that the different
parties were represented by one person in the application to intervene,
33
the Attorney General of Texas, did not combine them into one whole.1
Therefore, the court concluded that Stringellow did not preclude it from
1 34
hearing Texas's interlocutory appeal.
Concluding that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the Fifth Circuit turned to the issue of whether
could not intervene in the State of California's claim for recovery of
clean-up costs; and (3) it could not file any motions or conduct its own
discovery without first conferring with one of the original parties and obtaining its permission so to proceed. In all other respects, however, the
petitioner had full participation rights in the trial: It could attend all depositions, participate in all hearings to the extent not duplicative of other
parties, and receive copies of all discovery materials produced.
Id. (citation omitted).
131. See id. ("CNA will have the same rights on appeal ... as all other parties
(citing Stringfellow, 480 U.S. at 377)).
132. See id. ("The district court did not, as did the Stringfellow court, place
limitations on a single party's rights to participate in a legal proceeding, but rather
denied completely the rights of various different parties to participate in the instant
litigation."). Contrasting the decision in Stringfellow, the court stated, "Under the
court's order, other than the TDCJ, none of the other State constituencies will be
able to attend depositions, participate in any court hearings, receive copies of
court documents or discovery materials, or otherwise exercise participatory rights
in the litigation." Id.
133. See id. The court stated:

That the Attorney General serves as the common legal representative of
each of the various state agencies (and of the state qua state and as parens
patriae) does not fuse the varied interests of each of the diverse parts into
the whole. In fact, as this action evinces, the constituent parts have different, and at time divergent, goals and interests.
Id. The court noted that under Texas law, the Texas Attorney General held the
exclusive right to represent state agencies and that other attorneys who are permitted to assist the Attorney General are subordinate to his or her authority. See id.
(citing Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., 568 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978,
writ denied)).
The following statutes provide examples of the divergent interests the Attorney General may have to represent. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIc. CODE ANN. § 12.002
(West 1997) (requiring TDA to encourage development of agriculture and related
industries); TEX. PARRS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 12.0011 (West 1997) (requiring
TPWD to protect Texas's fish and wildlife resources); TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 5.013 (West 1997) (granting TNRCC jurisdiction over matters concerning Texas
surface water rights and quality); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (explaining that states have right to represent their citizens as
parens patriae); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating

Texas has right to represent state qua state).
134. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 314 ("The denial of intervention is therefore a
collateral order that is immediately appealable.").
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Texas could intervene of right in the Sierra Club's lawsuit. 135 It began by
stating that to intervene, applicants must show that their application is
timely, that they have an interest relating to the subject of the action, that
their ability to protect that interest may be impaired by disposition of the
action and that no existing party adequately represents their interests. 136
Because the Sierra Club did not raise the issues of timeliness and impairment of interest, the court only addressed whether Texas had a sufficient
interest to intervene and whether any of the parties adequately repre37
sented its interests.'
The Fifth Circuit next proceeded to apply a "direct, cognizable legal
interest" standard and concluded that Texas had a sufficient interest to
intervene under Rule 24(a) (2).138 It found that the State qua State had an
interest in enforcing its own legislation protecting the Edwards Aquifer,
and it also found that the State as representative of the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TRNCC) had an interest in the regulation of entities pumping water from the aquifer.' 3 9 The court held that
the State as representative of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Division
(TPWD) had an interest in protecting fish and wildlife and that the State
as representative of the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) had an
135. See id. (turning to issue of intervention under Rule 24(a)).

136. See id. (defining requirements of Rule 24(a) (2)). The court stated that it

reviews the timeliness requirement for abuse of discretion and the other requirements de novo. See id. (citing Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 n.2 (5th Cir.
1994)).
137. See id. at 315 ("Because the Sierra Club has not contested on appeal the
timeliness of the state's application nor whether the disposition may impair the
state's ability to protect its interests in the subject matter, we deem requirements
(1) and (3) satisfied.") (citing Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d
256, 260 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995)).
138. See id. (finding that Texas in its various capacities had interests which
were "several and important"). The court revealed the standard it used to identify
an interest sufficient to intervene under Rule 24(a) (2) when it stated that "we are
at a loss to understand [the Sierra Club's] insistence that these above-named constituencies do not have a direct, cognizable legal interest in the subject matter of
the litigation." Id.
139. See id. (noting that state qua state had interest in enforcing its own legislation protecting Edwards Aquifer and that state as representative of TNRCC had
interest in regulation of entities pumping water from aquifer).
The Texas Legislature enacted the Edwards Aquifer Act in 1993, creating a
regulatory scheme to manage the use of the aquifer. See Act of May 30, 1993, 73d
Leg., R.S. ch. 626, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2355, as amended by Act of May 29, 1995,
74th Leg., R.S., ch. 261, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2505 (West) (appointing board
of directors to manage aquifer). The Act created the Edwards Aquifer Authority,
an administrative body charged with overseeing the regulation of the aquifer. See
id. A lower state court originally held the Act unconstitutional, but in 1996 the
Texas Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Act as constitutional. See Sierra
Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing history
of Edwards Aquifer Act); Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 638 (Tex. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of Edwards Aquifer Act).
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interest in agricultural activities related to the aquifer. 140 Finally, it found
that the State as parens patriae had an interest in the welfare of citizens
affected by changes in the water level of the aquifer. 141 After identifying
these interests represented by Texas, the court held that the State had a
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation to satisfy the second requirement of Rule 24(a) (2).142
Finding that Texas satisfied the interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2), the
Fifth Circuit next concluded that none of the existing parties adequately
represented the State's interests. 143 Representation was inadequate because the interests of the existing parties diverged from the interests represented by the State. 144 The court stated that the interests of the
defendants, who were local entities that depended on the aquifer for
water, could not coincide with the interests of the state agencies, who were
charged with managing water resources on a statewide level. 145 It also
stated that the defendants' interests necessarily could not coincide with
the interests of the State qua State and of the State as parens patriae.146
Because of these divergent interests, the court found that the inadequate
1 47
representation prong of Rule 24(a)(2) was satisfied.
140. SeeSierra Club, 115 F.3d at 315 ("[T]he state as legal representative of the
TPWD has an interest in the protection of the state's fish and wildlife resources.")
(citing TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 12.0011 (West 1997)). The court noted
that the State had an interest in various agricultural activities related to the Edwards Aquifer. See id. ("[T] he state as legal representative of the TDA has an interest in maintaining and regulating agricultural interests affected by the aquifer,
including the financial assistance programs that support some of the pumper farmers.") (citing TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 12.002 (West 1997); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996)).
141. See id. ("[T] he state as parens patriaehas an interest in the physical and
economic health and well-being of the citizens directly affected by changes in the
water level draw-downs at the aquifer.") (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
142. See id. ("[W]e are at a loss to understand [the Sierra Club's] insistence
that these above-named constituencies do not have a direct, cognizable legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.").
143. See id. ("We similarly reject the Sierra Club's argument that the state's
various interests are represented adequately by the existing parties.").
144. See id. (stating that interests of local pumpers would not be same as interests of state agencies).
145. See id. The court stated:
It is axiomatic that the interests of the pumpers, who are local cities, businesses, and governmental entities that rely on the aquifer's water supply
for their immediate subsistence, will diverge from those of the various
state agencies who are charged with taking a state-wide view of the aquifer
as it affects wildlife, water resources and quality, and the agricultural
industry.
Id.
146. See id. (stating that interests of existing defendants "will diverge from
those of.. . the state qua state and as parens patriad').
147. See id. ("Plainly, the pumpers will not represent adequately the interests
of these state constituencies and, under Texas law, may not do so.") (citing Hill v.
Texas Water Quality Bd., 568 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, writ denied)).
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In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held that Texas had satisfied the four
requirements of Rule 24(a) (2) and was therefore entitled to intervention
of right. 148 Thus, the court reversed the order partially denying interven149
tion and remanded the case to the district court.
B.
1.

The Propriety of the Fifth Circuit's Interpretationof the Interest Requirement
Compliance with Supreme Court Precedent and Intentions of Drafters of
Rules

By requiring Texas to show a "direct, cognizable legal interest," the
Fifth Circuit applied Rule 24 in a manner that is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. In Donaldson, the Supreme Court stated that an applicant for intervention must possess an interest in the litigation that is "significantly protectable." 150 In Diamond, the concurring justices stated that
an applicant must show "a direct and concrete interest that is accorded
some degree of legal protection." 151 In Sierra Club, the Fifth Circuit required Texas to show a "direct, cognizable legal interest." 5 2 The Fifth
Circuit had previously employed similar language to mean an interest that
the substantive law recognizes as belonging to the applicant, a meaning
that is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the interest
153
requirement.
148. See id.
149. See id. ("[W]e reverse the partial denial of intervention and remand with
direction to the district court to grant the state's motion for intervention as of
right.") (emphasis omitted).
150. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971) ("What is obviously meant [by Rule 24(a) (2)] is a significantly protectable interest.").
151. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
152. See Sierra Club, 115 F.3d at 315 ("[W]e are at a loss to understand [plaintiffs] insistence that these above-named constituencies do not have a direct, cognizable legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.").
153. See Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2) requires "that the interest asserted be one that
the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant");
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th
Cir. 1984) (stating that direct, substantial, legally protected interest is one which
"substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant"); see
also Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 960 F.2d 550, 556 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2) requires "'direct, substantial, [and] legally protectable"' interest (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732
F.2d at 464)); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187
(5th Cir. 1989) ("To prove the requisite interest, an intervenor must demonstrate

a 'direct, substantial and legally protectable' interest in the property or transaction
that is the subject of the suit.").
In a series of cases, the Fifth Circuit has developed terminology that it consistently uses in intervention cases. It has stated that the necessary "direct, substantial
and legally protectable" interest is usually demonstrated if an applicant is a "real
party in interest." See Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that applicant had sufficient interest to intervene because it was "real
party in interest"); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 884 F.2d at 187 ("A movant
found to be a 'real party in interest' generally establishes sufficient interest."); New
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In addition to complying with the Supreme Court's treatment of Rule
24, the Fifth Circuit also effected the intention of the Rule's drafters to
broaden the application of the Rule. 154 Language that required an applicant to be "bound by" a court decision had prevented application of the
original Rule in cases where intervention was justified. 155 Recognizing
this shortcoming, the drafters of the 1966 Amendment intended to liber156
alize the Rule so that intervention could be granted in more instances.
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d at 464 (stating that requirement that interest be
recognized by substantive law is "reflected by the requirement that the claim the
applicant seeks intervention in order to assert be a claim as to which the applicant
is the real party in interest"). The court has stated that "the real party in interest
requirement of Rule 17(a), 'applies to intervenors as well as plaintiffs .... '" Id.
(quoting United States v. 936.71 Acres of Land, 418 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1969)).
It has also stated that "[t]he 'real party in interest' is the party who, by substantive
law, possesses the right sought to be enforced, and not necessarily the person who
will ultimately benefit from the recovery." Id. (quoting 936.71 Acres of Land, 418
F.2d at 556). The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that there is no uniform standard for determining who is a "real party in interest," but it has adopted a causation test to identify such parties. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 884 F.2d at
187 (adopting causation test used by district court). Under this test, "a 'real party
in interest' may be ascertained by determining whether that party caused the injury and, if so, whether it has the power to comply with a remedial order of the
court." Id.
154. See FED. R. Crv. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) (stating that Rule
was amended to "overcome certain difficulties which have arisen in the application
of [the original] Rule 24(a) (2) and (3)" and that original Rule was "unduly restricted"); see also MooRE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[1] [b] ("The inquiry required under Rule 24(a) (2) is a flexible one, and a practical analysis of the facts
and circumstances of each case is appropriate."); WRIGHT T AL., supra note 26,
§ 1904 ("It frequently has been said of Rule 24, as it is of the Civil Rules generally,
that it is to be given a liberal construction.") (footnote omitted); Kaplan, supra
note 50, at 405 (stating that revision of Rule 24 was intended to "drive beyond the
narrow notion of an interest in specific property."); Tobias, supra note 6, at 430
(stating drafters of Rule 24 contemplated modification of interest requirement);
Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 ("This amendment broadened and made more flexible the 'unduly restrictive' original rule."); Institutional Reform Litigation, supranote
3, at 1492 ("The provisions for necessary joinder and intervention were amended
in 1966 to meet the changing needs of the judicial system.").
155. See FED. R. Crv. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) ("If the 'bound'
language was read literally in the sense of resjudicata, it could defeat intervention
in some meritorious cases.").
156. See id. ("[T]he deletion of the 'bound' language similarly frees the rule
from undue preoccupation with strict considerations of resjudicata."); see also Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 153-54 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the revision was to remedy certain logical
shortcomings in the construction of the former 24(a) (2) . . . and to give recognition to decisions ... which had expanded intervention under the former 24(a) (3)
beyond the strict pro interesse suo model it embodied."); Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
court interprets Rule 24 broadly in favor of intervention); United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that application of Rule is to be
guided by practical considerations), vacated sub nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713
F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The rule was amended in 1966 in an effort... to
permit courts to look at practical considerations in determining whether an absen-
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In contrast to courts that interpret the interest requirement more narrowly, the Fifth Circuit's "direct, legally cognizable" standard does not require a party to be bound by the court's decision and thereby makes
157
intervention available in more situations.

tee seeking intervention is being adequately represented."); Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that Rule 24 was amended "to eliminate the
scissoring effect whereby a petitioner who could show 'inadequate representation'
was thereby thrust against the blade that he would therefore not be 'bound by a
judgment,' and to recognize the decisions which had construed 'property' so
broadly as to make surplusage of the adjective"); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We know from the recent amendments to the civil rules that
in the intervention area the 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to disposing
of lawsuits .... "); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 824-25 (5th
Cir. 1967) ("[T he Advisory Committee, unsatisfied with the former Rules which
too frequently defined application in terms of rigid legal concepts . . . as well as
court efforts in applying them, deliberately set out on a more pragmatic course.");
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 105 F.R.D. 106, 109
(D.D.C. 1985) (recognizing that "the 1966 amendments to rule 24 were designed
to liberalize the right to intervene in federal actions"), affd, 784 F.2d 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); MOORE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[1][b] ("The inquiry required
under Rule 24(a)(2) is a flexible one, and a practical analysis of the facts and
circumstances of each case is appropriate."); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1904
("It frequently has been said of Rule 24, as it is of the Civil Rules generally, that it is
to be given a liberal construction.") (footnotes omitted); Kaplan, supra note 50, at
405 (stating that revision of Rule 24 was intended to "drive beyond the narrow
notion of an interest in specific property"); Tobias, supra note 6, at 430 (stating
that drafters of Rule 24 contemplated modification of interest requirement); Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 ("This amendment broadened and made more flexible
the 'unduly restrictive' original rule.") (footnote omitted); InstitutionalReform Litigation, supra note 3, at 1492 ("The provisions for necessary joinder and intervention were amended in 1966 to meet the changing needs of the judicial system.").
157. Compare Ozee v. American Council on Gift Annuities, Inc., 110 F.3d
1082, 1096 (5th Cir.) (requiring applicant to have "direct, substantial, [and] legally
protectable interest in the proceedings"), vacated sub nom. American Council on
Gift Annuities v. Richie, 118 S. Ct. 597 (1997), Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1004 ("To
demonstrate an interest relating to the property or subject matter of the litigation
sufficient to support intervention of right, the applicant must have a 'direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings."'), Sierra Club v. Espy, 18
F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that applicant must have "direct, substantial, [and] legally protectable" interest), and New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d at
463 ("[I]ntervention [of right] still requires a 'direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings."' (quoting Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427
F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir. 1970))), with City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[A] movant for leave to intervene
under Rule 24(a) (2) must have Article III standing to participate in proceedings
before the district court."), Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that interest must be so direct that applicant would have right to maintain
claim for relief sought), Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("[A]n intervenor of right, just like an ordinary plaintiff, must have standing."),
and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779-81
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that applicant could not intervene because he lacked
significantlly protectable interest sufficient to confer standing).
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NoTE

The Interpretation'sEffect on the Flow of Information to the Court

In addition to being consistent with the principles underlying Rule
24(a) (2), the court's decision to allow the State of Texas to intervene in
this suit was appropriate because the Attorney General of Texas can provide important information regarding the State's interests1 5 8 One reason
for liberalizing the prerequisites for intervention, especially in public law
cases, is that intervenors are often able to offer additional information that
will enable the court to make a more informed decision.1 59 In Sierra Club,
the Attorney General of Texas will be able to introduce evidence concerning the citizens' dependence on the Edwards Aquifer and the legislative
scheme enacted by the Texas Legislature to regulate the aquifer.1 60 This
information will enable the district court to fashion a remedy that addresses the interests of all entities affected by the aquifer's management.
Although the Fifth Circuit's "direct, legally cognizable" standard allowed the Attorney General of Texas to bring important evidence into the
Sierra Club litigation, its use in other public law cases may exclude sources
of important information, resulting in less informed judicial decisions.1 6 1
While courts are experts in legal principles, they rely on the parties for
factual information, and public interest litigants are often experts in the
158. See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 115 F.3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir.
1997) (listing interests of Texas that Attorney General would represent before district court).
159. See Bullock, supra note 7, at 627 (stating that court's job is to reach correct legal decision and that it can only do so "with full and complete information"); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that courts rely on litigants for
"evidentiary foundation" of factual issues). One commentator stated that
"[intervention by a public interest group may also reduce the pressure on the
judge to fill gaps in proposed decrees that fail to account for the full range of
interests affected by the litigation." Id. at 296-97.
160. See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 794-96 (5th Cir.
1997) (discussing concerns Texas wished to represent in pending lawsuit). After
intervening, the Texas Attorney General would be able to protect the interests of
the State in regulating and conserving its water resources, including its need for
unified management and decisionmaking regarding the Edwards Aquifer. See id.
He would also be able to introduce evidence demonstrating the importance of the
aquifer to the state's citizens. See id.
161. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 656-57 (stating that during remedial process
district court has need for information and "[an] obvious way to obtain the information is to permit the people affected to participate in the suit"); Tobias, supra
note 3, at 329 (stating that denial of intervention by public law litigants "may deprive the federal judiciary of information, arguments, or perspectives it needs to
make the best decisions"); Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 3, at 1477
("[L]acking the information [applicants] could contribute, a court may choose a
remedy that ameliorates the plaintiffs' injury less fully and efficiently than would
other remedial alternatives."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 296 (providing examples
of how public interest litigants can add pertinent information in pending action).
Public interest litigants have expertise and motivation which can ensure that
shared societal values are considered. See id. (noting successful efforts of groups in
sex and race discrimination lawsuits).
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subject of the litigation they want to enter. 162 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that such "'organizations often have specialized expertise
and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that
individual plaintiffs lack."1 63 By expanding the amount of information
before the court, a public interest litigant can contribute to consent decrees or court decisions that would otherwise fail to consider the variety of
interests affected by the lawsuit.164 A court that narrowly interprets the
interest prong of Rule 24(a) (2) risks excluding this information.
162. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 329 ("Judges are generalists, and courts and
government litigants may not have adequate resources or the requisite expertise in
certain fields . . . ."); Bullock, supra note 7, at 627 ("A court can reach [a correct]
decision only with full and complete information."); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 296
(stating that courts rely on litigants for "evidentiary foundation" of factual issues).
163. International Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986) (quoting Note,
From Net to Sword: OrganizationalRepresentatives LitigatingTheir Members' Claims, 1974
U. ILL. L.F. 663, 669 [hereinafter From Net to Sword]). In International Union, an
action was brought challenging a Department of Labor policy that did not permit
the week in which an employee draws nonregular wages to be considered a week of
employment for purposes of determining eligibility for trade readjustment allowance benefits. See id. at 276-77. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia entered judgment for the employees and union, and an appeal was
taken. See id. at 279-80. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded.
See id. at 280. The Supreme Court held that the union had standing to litigate the
action on behalf of its members, that the Secretary of Labor failed to meet his
burden of presenting reasons to depart from principles of associational standing
and that the state agencies that determined the entitlement to benefits were not
"indispensable parties" so that their absence mandated dismissal. See id. at 292-93.
Concerning the importance of information provided by outsiders, the Court
stated:
The Secretary's presentation, however, fails to recognize the special features, advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole, that distinguish suits by associations on behalf of
their members from class actions. While a class action creates an ad hoc
union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only by their common
claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can
draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital. "Besides financial resources, organizations often have specialized expertise and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that
individual plaintiffs lack." These resources can assist both courts and
plaintiffs. As one court observed of an association's role in pending litigation: "[T]he interest and expertise of this plaintiff, when exerted on behalf of its directly affected members, assure 'that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult.., questions."'
Id. at 289 (quoting From Net to Sword, supra, at 669); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v.
Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
164. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 329 (stating that information and expertise
provided by intervenors "have special significance when the courts perform the
exceedingly complex and delicate task of fashioning relief in institutional reform
litigation"); Bullock, supra note 7, at 628 ("Often an intervenor has access to specialized information which it is best able to present; information that for some
reason the parties have not presented.") (footnote omitted); InstitutionalReform
Litigation, supra note 3, at 1474 ("Those persons and groups [who are affected by
the court's decision but not represented by the parties] are frequently in a position
to provide the court with information critical to the formulation of an effective
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NOTE
THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION ON PUBLIC
LAW LITIGATION

Although the Fifth Circuit's use of the "direct, cognizable legal interest" standard is legally sound and appropriate in Sierra Club, it may fail to
address issues peculiar to public law litigation that a less stringent standard
could accommodate. 165 For example, by requiring an applicant to show
an interest protected by some specific law, the court may deny an opportunity to be heard to parties who will be adversely affected by the litigation,
notwithstanding the lack of such an interest.1 6 6 A public interest litigant's
inability to demonstrate a specific, legally protected interest does not necessarily prove that the litigant will not be adversely affected by the court's
decision.1 67 Public interest litigants often guard broad societal interests
decree .... They should therefore be made parties to the remedial process.");

Vreeland, supra note 2, at 296-97 ("Intervention by a public interest group may also
reduce the pressure on the judge to fill gaps in proposed decrees that fail to account for the full range of interests affected by the litigation.").
165. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 328-29 (discussing negative effects of narrow
interpretation of Rule 24 on public law litigation); Institutional Reform Litigation,
supra note 3, at 1481 n.33 (describing negative effects of requiring direct, substantial and legally protectable interest); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 281 ("[A] court
should weigh the interests behind Rule 24(a) differently when a public interest
group seeks to intervene in a public law case."). One commentator noted that
"[b]ecause the interests balanced by Rule 24(a) are of different relative weights in
public law cases and private law cases, courts should distinguish the two situations."
Id. at 309.
166. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 328 ("When courts reject [public interest
groups'] requests to intervene, the potential parties forfeit the valuable opportunity to participate in litigation that could adversely affect interests they consider
significant ....");Bullock, supra note 7, at 639-40 ("Underlying Rule 24 is the
policy of protecting nonparties from having their interests adversely affected by
litigation conducted without their participation."); Institutional Reform Litigation,
supra note 3, at 1477 (stating that court may impose excessive proportion of remedial burden on applicants unless they are allowed to represent themselves in remedial process); see also Weinstein, supra note 26, at 232 (describing right to be heard
as "essential element of due process"). While writing his article, Weinstein was
serving as a judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
NewYork. See id. at 231. He argued that a court should allow any person who may
be affected by a court's decision to be heard "before their fate is sealed." Id. at
232. He stated that this is "vital to the effective functioning of the court, since it
minimizes the chance of error due to the lack either of knowledge or appreciation
of the variety of interests that may be affected." Id.
167. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 329 (noting that denial of intervention may,
in some circumstances, leave "particular individuals or entities ... wholly unrepresented, while certain viewpoints may remain unarticulated"); Vreeland, supra note
2, at 295 (stating that drafters of Rule 24 intended to permit intervention whenever outsider's interests might be impaired). One commentator stated:
When litigation centers on private rights, the presence of a litigable interest provides one useful measure of the dispute's impact on the outsider.
But the absenceof a litigable interest does not foreclose the possibility that
the dispute will significantly affect the outsider, particularly when litigation centers on public or regulatory policy that will affect a large number
of outsiders.
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held by large numbers of people, and the significance of their interests
stems from the breadth of interests that they represent. 1 68 As an example,
consider an anti-abortion advocacy group seeking to intervene in a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a law that it sponsored. A court could
deny the group's motion to intervene, holding that because only a state is
charged with defending the constitutionality of its laws, the group has no
legally protected interest. If the court subsequently declared the law unconstitutional, it would undermine the group's advocacy activities and efforts, as well as the interests of the individuals it represents. 169 Although
public interest litigants have alternatives to intervention, such as amicus
curiae status, these are often inadequate because they do not allow the
litigant to conduct discovery, participate in the negotiation of a consent
decree or introduce evidence supporting their position. 170 A court should
recognize that the interests of public interest intervenors are different
168. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 323 ("The concept of interest is important to
public interest litigants because they represent large numbers of unorganized people, such as the poor, who individually have interests that may appear relatively
insubstantial, or they seek to vindicate comparatively intangible interests like that
of the general public in clean air."). One commentator stated that public law litigation evolved from "the need of large numbers of people who individually lack
the economic wherewithal or the logistical capacity to vindicate important social
values or their own specific interests through the courts." Id. at 270. In their haste
to conclude complex litigation expeditiously, some courts have inadequately considered other important considerations, such as giving potential parties an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 336; see also Vreeland, supra note 2, at 295 (noting that
significance of public interest group's interests "lies in the breadth of interests
represented by the organization as a whole"). Public interest litigants generally
represent two types of interests when seeking to intervene. See id. at 303. They
represent the interests of their members as individuals, and they represent their
own interests as an organization. See id.
169. Cf Vreeland, supra note 2, at 287 (discussing example of lobbying group
appearing before court that requires standing before granting intervention and
noting that although group has no cause of action, decision could undermine
group's lobbying activities).
170. See Vreeland, supranote 2, at 297 (discussing use of alternatives to intervention in public law litigation); see also Laycock, supra note 25, at 128 (stating that
basic principles of due process require notice, hearing and adjudication before
court can deprive person of legal rights).
Amicus curiae status and reliance on government parties to represent the
public's interest, the traditional alternatives to intervention, are insufficient in
public law cases. See Vreeland, supra note 2, at 297 (discussing limitations of alternatives to intervention). When factual conclusions are crucial to the court's decision, a participant in the litigation is in a better position to ensure that the
evidence presented supports its viewpoint. See id. One commentator noted that
"[t] he very willingness of a public interest group to incur large court costs in order
to intervene in a suit indicates the limits of amicus status in serving its interests."
Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 26, at 241 (discussing advantages that intervention provides to applicants). Interestingly, this commentator stated that "responsible and competent" amici should be allowed to participate in evidentiary hearings
by calling witnesses, cross-examining and introducing documents. See id. at 237.
An amicus who is well financed will be able to hire necessary expert witnesses and
conduct statistical studies which could contribute to the evidence. See id. at 238.
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than those of private intervenors and adjust their application of Rule
171
24(a) (2)'s interest requirement accordingly.
In addition, use of a strict interpretation in public law litigation may
undermine the court's interest in judicial economy.17 2 Although granting
intervention would increase the scope of one lawsuit, it would preclude
the possibility of multiple lawsuits. 173 One federal judge doubted that a
relaxed application of Rule 24 "will produce costs in terms of complexity
that outweigh the advantage of access to the courts by those who may be
affected by the judicial decisions." 174 Exclusion of a public interest liti171. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 346 (stating that federal judges should apply
Rules "with considerably more solicitude for public interest litigants" in future
cases); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 301 ("[Because] the interests of public interest
group intervenors in public law litigation differ from those of individual intervenors in private disputes, a construction of Rule 24(a) that treated both situations the
same would defeat the drafters' emphasis on practicality."); see also Laycock, supra
note 25, at 128 (stating that courts should either refuse to approve any consent
decree that limits legal rights of third person who is not party to suit or hold third
person not bound by consent decree).
One commentator stated that courts should be more sensitive to the special
characteristics of public law cases and should recognize how the consequences of
applying the Rules differ between private and public litigation. See Tobias, supra
note 3, at 337. This commentator even suggested that a separate set of Rules be
written for public law litigation if the federal judiciary is not more receptive to the
concerns of public interest litigants. See id. at 345.
172. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 14, § 24.03[5] [b] [i] ("Economies of scale
may be achieved by involving as many concerned parties as is compatible with efficiency and due process."); Tobias, supra note 3, at 335-36 (stating that problems of
judicial interpretation of Rules involve issues of judicial economy); Weinstein,
supranote 26, at 246 (concluding that benefits of broader application of intervention would outweigh any additional costs); InstitutionalReform Litigation, supra note
3, at 1477 (stating that court which chooses inappropriate remedy "may then need
to supplement its decree until an effective remedy is discovered through trial and
error"); see also Vreeland, supra note 2, at 299 (discussing impact of intervention on
judicial economy). One author stated:
Intervention affects the courts' interests in fair and efficient adjudication,
both in the case'at hand and in the court system as a whole. When an
outsider claims a litigable interest, intervention may promote economy at
a systematic level by avoiding duplicative suits, which waste [judicial] resources, clog dockets, and frequently introduce the possibility of inconsistent judgments and complex collateral estoppel issues.
Id.
173. See Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 ("[Olne of the broad purposes of intervention under Rule 24 is to discourage piecemeal litigation."); Vreeland, supra
note 2, at 302 (discussing how denial of intervention can lead to multiple lawsuits
involving same issues).
174. Weinstein, supra note 26, at 246. This commentator stated:
My experience . . . in handling at least a score of cases that might be

characterized as public litigations is that granting an opportunity to be
heard in such cases at the district court level is entirely practicable. The
number of those who will want to appear in court is generally quite small
in proportion to those who might be affected. Moreover, most people
are quite sensible-they understand the burdens on court time and will
accede to reasonable requests to limit participation.
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gant may result in duplicative suits, inconsistent results and impairment of
the litigant's ability to pursue its own claims.1 75 If an applicant that is
denied intervention initiates its own action, judicial resources will be
wasted on a claim that could have been resolved earlier. 176 Furthermore,
a second suit may force a court to choose between reaching conflicting
judgments or allowing a previous decision to control the outcome of a
177
later one.
With the different interpretations of Rule 24 firmly entrenched in
each circuit's precedent, only a clear pronouncement on the interest requirement from the Supreme Court will resolve the disparity. 178 Some
commentators have suggested that a new rule regarding intervention by
public law litigants should be enacted, but application of such a rule
would be frustrated by the attempt to clearly distinguish between private
and public litigants. 179 Instead, the Supreme Court should declare that
175. See Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 (stating that intervention can prevent
complicated issues of collateral estoppel); Vreeland, supra note 2, at 302 ("Public
interest groups have demonstrated both the willingness and the ability to initiate
litigation; thus, denying their motions for intervention risks duplicative suits and
possibly inconsistent results, or impeding the group's ability to pursue its own legal
or constitutional claims.").
176. See Vreeland, supra note 2, at 302 (stating that denying motions for intervention risks duplicative suits). In public law litigation, the costs of multiple suits
are especially significant because multiple issues and other complexities strain
court resources. See id. (noting especially troublesome aspects of duplicative suits
in public law arena).
177. See Bullock, supra note 7, at 629 (stating that intervention can prevent
inconsistencies in fact finding and law determination); Vreeland, supra note 2, at
302 (discussing how denial of intervention raises possibility of inconsistent results).
One commentator noted that "a second suit poses a great risk of inconsistent and
conflicting decrees ....
" Id. As an example, she wrote that "a court cannot desegregate a school or structure a hazardous waste program under two different plans."
Id. Therefore, the result of the first suit may "establish the remedial scheme for all
practical purposes." Id.
178. See generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 33546 (suggesting solutions to
problems arising from application of Rules to public law litigation). One commentator, however, believes that "we know too little to formulate definitive conclusions" about the Rule's application to public law litigation. Id. at 338. This
commentator stated, "It would be helpful to have a clearer understanding of, and
more information about, numerous considerations relating to the Federal Rules
and to public law litigation." Id.
179. See id. at 345 ("If... the problems are more structural or systemic, in that
the Rules ...fail to accommodate effectively public law litigation ... more fundamental change, such as promulgating a separate set of Rules for public law litigation, may be indicated."); InstitutionalReform Litigation,supra note 3, at 1492 ("The
emergence of institutional reform litigation has created the need for yet another
amendment of the Rules."). But see Vreeland, supra note 2, at 309 ("Rule 24(a) as
written can accommodate public interest group intervention if courts are willing to
construe its requirements flexibly in the public law context.").
Application of a separate set of public law rules, however, would be difficult
because public law litigants cannot always be clearly identified. See Tobias, supra
note 3, at 340 (stating that public law should be defined in terms of its "numerous
salient characteristics"). One commentator admitted that "[b]ecause one definition cannot encompass the diverse forms that are included within the rubric of
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the interest requirement of Rule 24 is flexible and adjustable to the practical consequences of granting intervention, 80 This would allow district
courts to examine the unique facts of each case, acknowledge the differences between private and public litigation and strike an appropriate balance between competing interests.18 1 Perhaps the best approach was
public law litigation, it is preferable to speak of salient or defining characteristics
of that litigation." Id.
180. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 432 (discussing Supreme Court's treatment of
Rule 24(a) (2)). Interestingly, the Supreme Court, through its actions rather than
its words, may have demonstrated that Rule 24 is to be applied with concern for
the facts of each case. One commentator has stated that the Court's treatment of
Rule 24 has been "peculiarly fact-bound." See id. In CascadeNatural Gas Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., the Court read Rule 24 broadly and did not require the applicant to possess a particular legal interest. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1967). Critics have stated that the Court,
which was displeased with the lower court's handling of an antitrust case, used its
interpretation of Rule 24 as a means of achieving compliance with its previous

decree. See WRIGHT ET

AL.,

supra note 26, § 1908 (stating that Court had to allow

intervention to correct lower court's mishandling of consent decree); Tobias, supra
note 6, at 432-33 (stating that critics have ascribed Court's determination in Cascade to its displeasure with federal government's handling of antitrust case).
In contrast, the Supreme Court read Rule 24 narrowly in Donaldson v. United
States, when it denied intervention by a taxpayer in an action initiated by the Internal Revenue Service to obtain payroll records from the taxpayer's former employer. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). Writers have
criticized the Donaldson interpretation by stating that the Court manipulated procedure to protect the govemment's interest in effective enforcement of the tax
statutes. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 26, § 1908 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Donaldson); Tobias, supra note 7, at 433 (reviewing critical interpretations of Court's opinion in Donaldson).
181. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 346 (concluding that federal courts should
apply Rules with "considerably more solicitude" for public law litigants); Weinstein, supra note 26, at 246 ("The federal courts 'should nourish remedial approaches characterized by the greatest feasible amount of general participation,
fact finding, and negotiation."' (quoting Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., The Remedial
Process in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 929 (1978))); Vreeland, supranote 2, at 305 (stating that when deciding motions to intervene, "courts
should evaluate the group's interest with reference to the nature of the particular
controversy").
One commentator concluded that many of the problems created by application of the Rules to public law litigation can be solved without "straining either the
language of the Rules or judicial credibility." Tobias, supra note 3, at 336. This
commentator stated that "[]udges can and should accord flexible and pragmatic
interpretations to the Rules in public law cases," and that "[c]ourts should also be
sensitive to the special characteristics of public law litigation in contrast to private
law litigation and should recognize the implications of applying the Rules to both
types of suits." Id. at 337.
After granting intervention of right to a public law litigant, a court can further
tailor its participation to the case's unique facts by placing restrictions on those
litigants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) (stating that
courts may subject intervention of right to "appropriate conditions or restrictions
responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the
proceedings"). Courts have conditioned a public law litigant's intervention by limiting the issues it can raise, denying it the right to ajury trial, limiting its participation to a particular phase of the trial and requiring it to consolidate discovery and
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suggested by a federal judge who stated that Rule 24(a) (2) must be given
the flexibility necessary "'to cover the multitude of possible intervention
situations.' "182
Brian Hutchings

motions presentations. See Vreeland, supra note 2, at 307 n.148 (discussing cases in
which intervention was restricted by court).
182. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d
Cir. 1984) (quoting Restor-A-Dent Dental Lab., Inc. v. Certified Alloy Prod., Inc.,
725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1984)). In his opinion, Judge Friendly also stated that
Rule 24(a) (2) requires "consideration of all of the competing and relevant interests raised by an application for intervention." Id. (citing United States v. City of
Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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